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ABSTRACT 
The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as 
maximization of shareholder wealth. Law and economics scholars have incorporated the 
shareholder primacy norm into their empirical analyses of regulatory efficiency. An 
increasingly influential body of scholarship uses empirical methodology to evaluate legal 
rules that allocate power within the corporation. By embracing the shareholder primacy 
* Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. E-mail: jfisch@law.fordham.edu. Prepared for the 
symposium on Robert Clark’s Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Change held on September 8 and 9, 2005, at the 
University of Iowa College of Law. An initial draft of this paper was presented at the Conference on 
Comparative Institutional Analysis at the University of Wisconsin Law School, and I am particularly grateful 
for the thoughtful discussion and comments provided by participants at that conference as well as for Neil 
Komesar’s efforts in organizing and hosting the program. Many helpful comments have also been provided by 
Melvin Eisenberg, Lynn Stout, Iman Anabtawi, Mark Weinstein, Brett McDonnell, participants in the Clark 
Symposium, the Berkeley Law & Economics Workshop, the Law & Economics Workshop at Queens 
University, the UCLA-Sloan Conference on the Means and Ends of Corporations, and the Columbia-UCLA 
Conference on Shareholder Democracy: Its Promises and Perils. 
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norm, empirical scholars offer normative assessments about regulatory choices based on 
the effect of legal rules on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, 
and Tobin’s Q. 
This Article challenges the foundations of using the shareholder primacy norm to 
judge corporate law. As this Article explains, existing legal doctrine and economic theory 
provide only limited support for shareholder primacy. Similarly, shareholder primacy 
cannot be justified as a necessary consequence of existing limits on the enforcement of 
management fiduciary duties. This Article demonstrates that, rather than defining the 
corporation’s objectives, the limited scope of a fiduciary duty claim provides a 
mechanism for institutional specialization in responding to the needs of different 
corporate stakeholders. Comparative institutional analysis suggests that the courts are 
uniquely positioned to protect the interests of shareholders in the context of inter-
stakeholder conflicts. Implementation of this role through rules that grant shareholders a 
unique degree of judicial access does not privilege the interests of shareholders in the 
evaluation of firm value. 
The presence of other stakeholders, whose interests in the firm may not be reflected 
in an assessment of shareholder value, offers reasons to question the conclusions of 
existing empirical research. In addition, the measures of shareholder value typically 
employed by empirical scholars—particularly short-term stock price—are problematic as 
indicators of firm value and may reinforce inappropriate managerial decisions. This 
Article maintains that empirical scholars need to offer better and explicit justifications for 
their reliance on shareholder wealth and, more importantly, for their argument that 
shareholder wealth effects should dominate regulatory policy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, Robert Clark’s 1986 analysis of the shareholder primacy norm could 
have been written today.1 Chapter 16 of Clark’s treatise, Corporate Law, describes five 
clusters of views concerning the proper role and objectives of the corporation.2 Citing 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach, Clark warns of the peril of attempting to 
choose among them.3
Twenty years have passed since the publication of Corporate Law. Nonetheless, the 
debate over the shareholder primacy norm continues. At one end of the spectrum are 
those commentators who argue that a corporation’s sole goal should be the maximization 
of shareholder wealth; at the other are those who argue that the corporation should be 
managed in the interests of a broad range of stakeholders.4
Much has changed, however, in the past 20 years. Since Clark published his treatise 
 1. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 675-703 (1986). 
 2. Id. at 677. 
 3. Id. at 702. 
 4. Steve Bainbridge describes shareholder primacy as encompassing “two distinct principles: 1) the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . and 2) the principle of ultimate shareholder control.” Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 573 
(2003). A third and related principle is that shareholder primacy defines the beneficiaries of judicially 
enforceable fiduciary duties by management. In his analysis of director primacy, Bainbridge focuses on the 
second principle—the extent of manager versus shareholder control. Id. at 574. In contrast, this Article focuses 
on the first and third principles and, particularly in Part III, on the relationship between the two. 
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in 1986, an entire chapter of corporate law concerning the rights and powers of 
managements, shareholders, and other stakeholders in the context of control contests has 
been written and refined. Corporations have experimented with new methods of 
management compensation, including the dramatic rise in executive stock options.5 
Institutional investors have become increasingly important—and increasingly active—
equity holders. These changes, and many others, have affected the allocation of power 
among corporate constituencies and, in turn, given new importance to evaluating the 
effects of this allocation of power upon firm value and social welfare. 
An explosion of empirical analysis of corporate law—also an important 
development since 1986—has responded to this demand.6 An increasing number of 
scholars in law, economics, finance, and related fields are using event studies, regression 
analysis, and other statistical tools to evaluate the effect of corporate law on firm value. 
The normative framework for this work is efficiency analysis.7 The studies seek to 
identify as efficient those legal rules that maximize firm value and, on the basis of this 
efficiency analysis, to offer concrete evidence to guide lawmakers with respect to 
regulatory choices such as the allocation of authority between shareholders and directors, 
or the scope of a litigation remedy for corporate misconduct. 
Empirical scholars have embraced the shareholder primacy norm. Although the 
studies frequently fail to define firm value explicitly, they incorporate the concept of 
shareholder primacy by evaluating legal rules in terms of their effect on measures of 
shareholder value such as stock price and Tobin’s Q. Consequently, the resulting 
efficiency analysis evaluates regulatory efficiency in terms of shareholder wealth. 
Shareholder wealth may be an appropriate proxy for a broader conception of firm 
value. Alternatively, shareholder wealth may simply be the normatively appropriate basis 
for evaluating the efficiency of corporate law. However, most existing empirical studies 
do not justify their reliance on shareholder wealth in these terms. Indeed, most studies do 
not expressly consider the implications of using shareholder wealth as a measure of firm 
value, despite the fact that they purport to be conducting a general efficiency analysis in 
which the primary goal should be maximizing the size of the corporate surplus, while 
 5. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 ACCENTURE J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 21, 23 (2003) (describing the rise in median equity-based compensation of executives at S&P 500 
companies from 0% in 1984 to 66% in 2001). 
 6. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of Empirical Research in Corporate Law 
Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 982-83 (2004) (reviewing MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINATES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003)) (identifying the “explosion” in 
new corporate law empirical scholarship). 
 7. The Article consciously adopts the normative framework of welfare economics and efficiency 
analysis, excluding, for purposes of this discussion, independent considerations of equity or fairness. See, e.g., 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (2001) (offering a 
definition of welfare economics and distinguishing fairness considerations). Within this framework, the 
applicable standard is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43-
44 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). Economists commonly argue that distributional concerns 
can be addressed through tax and transfer policies, although this claim has been criticized both generally and 
with respect to corporate law. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee 
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1254-55 (2004) (questioning the goal of Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency in corporate law); see also Chris W. Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001) (advocating equity-informed legal rules). 
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considerations of the appropriate division of the corporate surplus should be secondary.8
Clark recognized the problems inherent in various attempts to specify the corporate 
objective, concluding that an effort to choose among the different conceptions was likely 
to be “inconsequential or misguided.”9 Despite Clark’s rational skepticism, current 
scholars have overwhelmingly embraced the shareholder primacy norm. This Article 
explores the justifications for this choice, focusing in particular on the implications of 
incorporating the shareholder primacy norm into empirical research. 
This Article begins, in Part II, by demonstrating the centrality of the shareholder 
primacy norm to the evaluation of regulatory efficiency in corporate law. This Article 
focuses on the premise of most empirical research—that firm value is equivalent to 
shareholder wealth—and argues that scholars have failed to justify this premise. Part III 
explores the extent to which reliance on shareholder primacy can be justified in terms of 
existing law, practice, or economic theory. Part IV considers the specific subject of 
fiduciary duties and argues that, while there are compelling reasons to favor shareholder 
primacy as a limit on the scope of legally enforceable fiduciary duties, the scope of 
fiduciary duties does not offer a basis for defining the corporate objective exclusively in 
terms of shareholder wealth. Part V identifies possible concerns in premising efficiency 
analysis on the shareholder primacy norm. In particular, Part V observes that measures of 
shareholder wealth are poorly suited to capture certain issues of particular importance to 
corporate regulation, such as transfers of wealth between corporate stakeholders, 
externalities, and the appropriate level of risk-taking. 
Ultimately, corporate scholarship must confront the appropriate definition of firm 
value for purposes of efficiency analysis. Although the appropriate corporate objective 
may be the maximization of shareholder wealth, scholars have not yet made the case. 
Consequently, empirical analyses of shareholder wealth may not support the efficiency 
conclusions offered by their authors, particularly when the subjects of the analyses are 
legal rules that allocate rights among competing corporate constituencies, rules that 
impose externalities on other corporations, or rules that affect the overall level of risk 
borne by the corporation’s stakeholders. If this is the case, the challenge for future 
empirical scholars is to develop methods by which to incorporate a broader conception of 
firm value into their research. 
II. EFFICIENCY IN CORPORATE LAW AND THE MAXIMIZATION OF SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
Easterbrook and Fischel posed a fundamental question almost 15 years ago: “Is 
corporate law efficient or not?”10 As Randall Thomas has observed, corporate legal 
scholarship has, in recent years, increasingly sought to answer that question through 
empirical research.11 Some scholars have used event studies to measure the effect of 
specific regulatory changes.12 The purpose of these studies is to assess the effect of a 
 8. Cf. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-11 (3d ed. 2003) 
(defining efficient legal rules as those that maximize aggregate social welfare). 
 9. CLARK, supra note 1, at 702. 
 10. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
212 (1991). 
 11. Thomas, supra note 6, at 982. 
 12. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES 
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particular legal rule or component of corporate structure on firm value.13 Thus, for 
example, Michael Bradley and Cindy Schipani examined the effect on stock prices of 
new legislation permitting corporations to limit or eliminate director liability for 
violations of the duty of care. They concluded that, because adoption of director 
exculpation statutes resulted in lower stock prices, the statutes inefficiently lowered firm 
value.14 Similarly, Jonathan Karpoff and Paul Malatesta studied the adoption of second 
generation antitakeover statutes, finding a small negative effect on stock prices.15
Other studies analyze firm-specific differences to compare the effect of variations in 
firm structure. Bernard Black and Sanjai Bhagat studied the impact of board 
independence on firm performance.16 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick constructed a 
corporate governance index to measure the aggregate effect of a variety of governance 
mechanisms—including many takeover defenses—on firm value.17 Roberta Romano 
analyzed the effect of confidential voting and determined that it does not affect firm 
performance.18
Still others have compared legal regimes, most commonly Delaware versus other 
states. Interstate comparisons are useful in evaluating the debate over regulatory 
competition as well as seeking to explain why most large public companies are 
incorporated in Delaware.19 For example, Rob Daines and Guhan Subramanian have 
both attempted to evaluate the efficiency of Delaware law, relative to that of other states, 
by looking at the correlation between Delaware incorporation and firm value.20 The 
influence of these studies is substantial: the Wall Street Journal prominently reported 
REGULATION 64-70 (2002) (describing the use of event studies in evaluating corporate law). 
 13. Most commonly, studies seek to evaluate the effect of a legal rule on firm value, using stock price or 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm's stock market value to the book value of 
its assets. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1775, 1785 (2002) (defining Tobin’s Q). In theory, there should be a strong correlation between stock 
price and long-run returns to stockholders. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 18-20 (exploring 
the extent to which stock price reflects a firm’s current and future value). But see Robert Dean Ellis, Equity 
Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 399, 416 n.64 (1998) (reporting 
study results finding a correlation of only .4859 between cumulative returns and return on equity). 
Alternatively, some studies seek to examine performance, a flow-type variable, rather than focusing on a static 
variable such as value. The finance literature has considered extensively the extent to which performance is 
correlated with value, as well as the most appropriate measure of performance. See id. (reporting a study finding 
a correlation of only 0.2386 between shareholder returns and pre-tax profits); see also infra Part V (discussing 
methods of evaluating firm performance). 
 14. Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Economic Importance of the Business Judgment Rule: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Trans Union Decision and Subsequent Delaware Legislation, in THE BATTLE FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL 105 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991) (finding that the passage of section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law actually lowered the value of Delaware corporations). 
 15. Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second Generation State Takeover 
Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (1989). 
 16. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term 
Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). 
 17. Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
 18. Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 502-06 (2003). 
 19. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (explaining the debate over regulatory competition and efforts to 
explain Delaware’s dominance as the site of incorporation for large public companies). 
 20. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 46 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004). 
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Daines’s finding that Delaware firms were worth 5% more than firms incorporated 
elsewhere.21
Overall, these studies seek both to analyze specific legal rules and to identify the 
best way to make corporate law.22 Empirical studies have been widely cited in the debate 
over regulatory competition, primarily to support Judge Winter’s claim that market 
competition constrains management and produces efficient regulation—a so-called race 
“to the top.”23 Empirical research has been influential in debates over regulatory policy. 
Surprisingly, however, this empirical research has failed to provide convincing answers 
to many of the efficiency questions to which it has been directed. 
For example, Guhan Subramanian’s study of Delaware incorporation, extending and 
subsequent to the Daines study, found insufficient evidence that Delaware incorporation 
was correlated with higher firm value.24 Subramanian found first that the “Delaware 
effect” was driven by small firms, and second that it disappeared during the period from 
1997 to 2002.25 Subramanian therefore concluded that Daines had failed to provide 
convincing empirical support for the race-to-the-top theory. Relatedly, Roberta Romano 
has reported that a number of event studies have found positive stock price effects 
associated with reincorporation in Delaware, but that the several studies attempting to use 
performance-based measures to evaluate the effect of incorporation have found “no 
significant difference in accounting performance.”26
Similarly, empirical studies of corporate governance reforms, such as independent 
boards or board committees, have produced conflicting results.27 Thus, for example, the 
recent large sample, long-horizon study of the impact of board independence conducted 
by Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black failed to find any correlation between board 
independence and firm value or financial performance.28 In contrast, Laura Lin has cited 
research indicating a positive relationship between director independence and firm 
performance.29
 21. Steven Lipin, Deals & Deal Makers: Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are Valued More by Investors, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21. 
 22. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 
383 (2003) (suggesting that, because Delaware faces very limited competition for out-of-state corporations, 
existing market pressure may be insufficient to produce efficient legal rules); cf. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s 
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (identifying the role of potential federal override as a constraint on 
state corporate law). 
 23. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Development of the Law of Corporate Governance, 9 DEL J. CORP. L. 524, 
528 (1984). 
 24. Subramanian, supra note 20, at 57. 
 25. Id. 
 26. ROMANO, supra note 12, at 72-73. 
 27. See Jill Fisch & Caroline Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney 
Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 559-63 (2003) (summarizing empirical 
studies).  
 28. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-
Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). Bhagat and Black used a variety of variables to measure 
firm value and performance, including Tobin’s Q, return on assets, ratio of sales to assets, and market-adjusted 
stock price. Id. at 242. They also tested their results with other accounting measures such as sales per employee 
and cash flow. Id. 
 29. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories 
and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 922 (1996). 
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The absence of more definitive results from empirical research may be due to 
methodological weaknesses. Commentators have offered many criticisms of the design 
and methodology of corporate empirical research.30 Critics have noted, for example, that 
event studies and other studies that use stock price may depend on unrealistically strong 
assumptions about the efficiency of the markets. Some scholars have identified 
weaknesses in the assumptions underlying the predicted stock market response to the 
studied event.31 Event studies depend critically upon identifying the appropriate event; 
researchers have argued that, in some cases, studies are not focusing on the correct event. 
The financial literature is replete with debates over the most appropriate tools for 
measuring firm performance. Economists have also identified flaws in the use of Tobin’s 
Q, particularly with respect to the method used to measure the replacement cost of firm 
assets.32
To date, however, scholars have not focused on one core aspect of corporate 
empirical research: its equation of firm value with shareholder value.33 As Subramanian 
states, commentators share common assumptions that the social welfare goal under 
analysis is maximization of shareholder wealth.34 The empirical studies uniformly 
evaluate corporate law in terms of its impact on a shareholder-based component of 
corporate value. Whether the variable used is net profits, stock price, or Tobin’s Q, in 
each case, the authors are determining efficiency by reference to shareholder wealth. The 
design of the studies is premised on the conclusion that efficient corporate rules are those 
rules that maximize returns to shareholders. 
Within a framework of welfare economics in which the goal is societal wealth 
maximization, firm value is conceptually distinct from shareholder value.35 Corporations 
provide value to a variety of nonshareholder groups, including managers, employees, 
creditors, customers, and suppliers. A corporation provides value to its creditors in the 
form of interest on and repayment of its debt. It provides value to managers and other 
employees through jobs that yield compensation, fringe benefits, perquisites, and, in 
some cases, the development of specialized skills or marketable reputations. A 
corporation provides value to its customers and its suppliers through voluntary surplus-
producing market transactions.36
 30. For an overview of methodological weaknesses common to empirical research conducted by legal 
scholars, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, Exchange: Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 31. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz, Comment, A Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit: 
Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 346-47 (1986) (questioning study’s prediction about the predicted stock 
market response to announcements about derivative litigation). 
 32. See, e.g., Wilbur Lewellen & S.G. Badrinath, On the Measurement of Tobin’s Q., 44 J. FIN. ECON. 77 
(1997) (finding flawed methodology in common computations of Tobin’s Q and proposing an alternative 
approach). 
 33. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113 
(1987) (describing “the maximization of equity share prices as the core goal of corporation law”). 
 34. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the 
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (2002). 
 35. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition 
in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1485 (1992) (observing that, because “a given corporate law issue 
. . . implicates not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of third parties . . . these [third party] 
interests must be taken into account in arriving at the socially optimal rule). 
 36. Corporations may also provide value to the communities in which they are located, through the 
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Firm value will, by its nature, exceed shareholder value because most or all of the 
value provided to nonshareholder stakeholders, in the form of salaries, interest payments, 
and so forth, is explicitly excluded from shareholder-oriented concepts of firm value such 
as corporate profit. Similarly, because it is distributed to nonshareholder stakeholders, 
this excess does not affect shareholder returns and ultimately will not be reflected in 
stock price. Empirical studies that measure efficiency in terms of shareholder wealth 
therefore exclude the effect of regulatory changes on nonshareholder constituencies 
within the corporation. 
Why do empirical analyses of the efficiency of corporate law focus on shareholder 
wealth? There are several possible explanations. First, data on shareholder wealth, 
particularly changes in market capitalization, are easy to obtain. Although empirical 
research could probably incorporate a reasonable measure of creditor value, based on 
something like the market value of publicly traded corporate debt,37 neither the legal nor 
the financial literature has developed standardized measures of employee value, customer 
value, and so forth.38 Second, researchers may believe shareholder wealth is a reasonably 
good proxy for firm value. Even if shareholder wealth does not reflect aggregate firm 
value, if regulatory changes are likely to have a similar effect on all corporate 
constituencies—that is, if shareholder wealth is closely correlated with firm value—any 
error resulting from the use of shareholder wealth is likely to be small. Third, because 
corporate and securities law focus on the role and rights of investors, scholars may 
believe that the effect of changes in corporate law on nonshareholder constituencies may 
legitimately be disregarded for purposes of their analysis.39
If researchers have focused on shareholder wealth because of the relative ease of 
data collection, the consequence may be merely that some of their conclusions are 
somewhat narrower than claimed. Empirical scholars can frame their conclusions 
explicitly in terms of shareholder wealth rather than overall firm value or societal 
efficiency, and indeed, a few scholars have done so. One example is the work by Rob 
Daines and Michael Klausner analyzing the effect of antitakeover protection in IPO 
property taxes that they pay, the services they provide, even the charitable activities in which they engage. The 
range of stakeholders and scope of interests that should be taken into account in assessing firm value is a matter 
of some debate. 
 37. See, e.g., Mark Klock et al., Tobin's q and Measurement Error: Caveat Investigator, 43 J. ECON. & 
BUS. 241, 245 (1991) (identifying a method of constructing imputed value for privately placed debt to refine a 
Tobin’s Q calculation). 
 38. Disclosure laws, which are oriented in terms of shareholder wealth, could be modified to increase the 
transparency of other components of firm value. See Marleen O’Connor, Rethinking Corporate Financial 
Disclosure of Human Resource Values for the Knowledge-Based Economy, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 527 
(1998) (advocating the revision of accounting procedures to increase disclosure of human resource values); see 
also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Contestable Claims of Shareholder Wealth Maximization: Evidence from the 
Airline Industry (Nov. 25, 2002) (unpublished paper) (developing a market-based measure of the value of 
labor). 
 39. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 441-42 (2001) (arguing that shareholder value is the normatively appropriate focus of corporate law and 
that the interests of other corporate stakeholders are better addressed through other bodies of law such as labor 
law, consumer law, and so forth); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business: Stakeholders and 
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 132 (2004) (detailing extensive 
stakeholder protection through the broader law of business but terming the distinction between corporate law 
and other business law “artificial”). 
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charter provisions.40 Although their paper title poses the question in terms of “firm 
value,” Daines and Klausner make clear in the body of the paper that the focus of their 
analysis is shareholder wealth. Importantly, the authors explicitly recognize the 
distinction between maximization of shareholder wealth and efficiency, identifying the 
possibility that antitakeover provisions may protect management private benefits at the 
expense of shareholders.41
Legal research that examines the impact of regulatory change on shareholder value 
is valuable. Relatedly, such research can be defended on normative grounds as focused 
upon the core subject of corporate law. Clark argued, for example, that corporate law and 
securities regulation “are simply defined to deal only with the relationships between 
shareholders and managers.”42 Empirical studies should, however, be clear about the 
scope of any efficiency claims based on such analysis. Alternatively, researchers who 
seek broader efficiency implications may need to counteract the lamplight effect and 
expand their data collection. 
As to the argument that shareholder wealth serves as a legitimate proxy for firm 
value, this claim is at least partially true. On many issues, the interests of multiple 
corporate stakeholders are aligned.43 Indeed, as Clark recognized, there is also 
considerable overlap between firm interests and societal interests. Clark described the 
monist viewpoint as the claim that, in the long run, there is an identity between public 
and corporate interests.44 Charles Wilson put it in somewhat different terms: “What was 
good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.”45
Surprisingly, little research demonstrates a correlation between doing well and doing 
good, that is, a correlation between corporate performance and decisions that favor the 
interests of nonshareholder stakeholders or the public at large.46 Despite the existence of 
an extensive literature arguing for increased corporate social responsibility, there is scant 
evidence that corporate decisions favoring the interests of workers, customers, or the 
community actually increase the size of the pie, as opposed to reflecting transfers of 
 40. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection 
in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001). 
 41. See id. at 110-12 (characterizing efficiency in terms of the sum of share value and private benefits to 
management). 
 42. CLARK, supra note 1, at 30. 
 43. In addition, shareholders may also be creditors, customers, and employees, leading them to care about 
the effects of corporate conduct on nonshareholder constituencies. See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, Do Publicly 
Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?, 3 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y  1 (2003) (describing 
how shareholder interests may extend beyond share price). 
 44. CLARK, supra note 1, at 681. 
 45. Nomination of Charles Wilson for Secretary of Defense Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 83d Cong., 
1st Sess., 26 (1953). 
 46. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. GARONE, THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE (1999) (finding inconclusive evidence demonstrating that good corporate citizenship improves 
financial performance); WALKER INFO., INC., MEASURING THE BUSINESS VALUE OF CORPORATE 
PHILANTHROPY 6 (2000), available at  
http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Corporate_Grantmaking/Measurement/Measuring_the_Business_Value_of
_Corp_Phil-Executive_Summary.pdf (summarizing the literature and finding that “[e]mpirical research on the 
relationship between corporate citizenship and corporate financial performance has yet to prove a conclusive 
link”). 
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wealth from one group of stakeholders to another.47 To the extent that researchers are 
relying on shareholder wealth as a proxy for firm or societal value, empirical evidence 
documenting the relationship would be helpful. 
Even if the interests of corporate stakeholders are, in many cases, aligned, 
sometimes they are not. In at least a subset of corporate decisions, there is a true conflict 
between the interests of different stakeholders, and a decision that benefits one class of 
stakeholders will harm another. Moreover, many of the corporate rules upon which 
empirical research is focused are addressed to these types of intra-capital structure 
battles. Takeover regulation, the scope of director and officer liability, board structure, 
and executive compensation all have the potential to affect wealth transfers between 
stakeholders. The decision to evaluate these rules exclusively in terms of shareholder 
wealth requires normative justification for favoring shareholder interests, at the expense 
of other stakeholders. 
The implicit assumption then, in existing empirical research, is that the shareholder 
primacy norm permits or requires empirical scholars to define efficiency in corporate law 
exclusively in terms of shareholder wealth. Is such a claim justified? Answering this 
question requires a more careful analysis of the basis for the shareholder primacy norm 
and the extent to which it constrains corporate decision-making, an analysis to which this 
Article turns in the next part. 
III. THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM 
A. Origins of the Norm 
1. The Berle-Dodd Debate 
Shareholder primacy, the obligation of corporate decision-makers to focus on 
shareholder interests, is a dominant principle in corporate law.48 The American Law 
Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance state “a corporation . . . should have as its 
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
 47. See Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 
353 (2004) (reviewing extensive literature attempting to link stakeholder management with performance and 
concluding that empirical results fail to support such a relationship); see also Mark S. Klock et al., Does 
Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 693 (2005) (concluding that 
antitakeover provisions, although not beneficial to shareholders, are valued by creditors); Olubunmi Faleye et 
al., When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance (2004) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=498962 (finding that favoring labor interests is inconsistent with shareholder 
value maximization); Henrik Cronqvist et al., Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More? (Dec. 2, 
2005) (unpublished paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=845844 (finding that, as a result of agency 
problems, entrenched managers pay higher wages, benefiting workers at the expense of shareholders). But see 
Wayne F. Cascio, Downsizing: What Do We Know? What Have We Learned?, 7 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 95 
(1993) (finding that, contrary to management claims, corporate downsizing was associated with lower long term 
stock performance). 
 48. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model 
of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1326 (1992) (stating that “the fundamental goal of corporate 
law is so theoretically and historically obvious that it need not be explicated: the goal is to maximize 
corporate—and thus shareholder—welfare”). 
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shareholder gain.”49 Although some scholars, most notably progressive scholars, have 
questioned whether the norm is either descriptively accurate or normatively appropriate, 
the vast majority of commentators accept the premise that the primary objective of the 
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.50
The origins of the shareholder primacy norm can be found in the classic debate 
between Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle in the 1930s, which took place at the time when 
the U.S. corporation was expanding from an organizational form used primarily for 
public work—building and operating railroads, ferry services, bridges, and the like—to 
the foundational form for private business enterprise. Berle and Dodd were actually 
debating two questions—how properly to characterize the developing structure of 
corporate law and, relatedly, how corporate law should develop in the future. Thus Berle, 
who espoused the conception of shareholder primacy in the debate, argued that corporate 
law was essentially a variant of trust law, in which corporate managers owed fiduciary 
duties to manage the corporation in the interests of the shareholder-beneficiaries.51 
Berle’s claim was primarily descriptive: “[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation . . . are . . . exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all 
shareholders as their interest appears.”52 Berle’s argument was premised on the 
conception of shareholders as owners of the corporation. Managers’ obligations to 
shareholders stem from their role as trustees or agents for these owners. Berle’s rationale 
for drawing upon the law of trusts was to constrain management discretion, which he 
viewed as leading to self-dealing, by interposing fidelity to shareholders as a requirement 
for legitimacy. 
Dodd responded with the essentially normative and largely aspirational argument 
that expanded the trust conception of corporate managers by extending their obligations 
to a wider set of beneficiaries. Dodd argued that managers “should concern themselves 
with the interests of employees, consumers, and the general public, as well as of the 
stockholders.”53 Dodd sought to distance corporate or business law from private law, 
claiming that public opinion was moving the law toward a view in which the business 
corporation has “a social service as well as a profit-making function.”54
Berle’s response to this argument was pragmatic.55 As he explained, increasing 
managerial discretion reduced managerial accountability. Moreover, managers could not 
feasibly be held accountable to employees, creditors, or the general public, as Dodd had 
proposed. Consequently, Berle stated: “When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate 
management and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management 
and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.”56
The Berle-Dodd debate was, in reality, less of a debate than commentators typically 
 49. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§2.01(a) (1994). 
 50. But see William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency 
Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1456 (1993) (noting that under the ALI principles “maximization 
language is eschewed in favor of an equivocal directive to ‘enhance’”). 
 51. Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1074 (1931). 
 52. Id. at 1049. 
 53. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156 (1932). 
 54. Id. at 1148. 
 55. Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). 
 56. Id. at 1367. 
FISCH FINAL.DOC 9/1/2006  11:00:24 AM 
648 The Journal of Corporation Law [Spring 
 
suggest. In 1942, Dodd acknowledged various legal and practical obstacles to treating 
corporate managers as trustees for workers and consumers and conceded that it was 
misleading to characterize the relationship between managers and nonshareholder 
constituencies in terms of a trust.57 In turn, Berle subsequently conceded that, at least as 
a descriptive matter, corporate law came to adopt Dodd’s position, granting managers 
wide discretion to manage the corporation in the general interests of society.58 In other 
words, both Berle and Dodd distinguished the legal obligations of managers to 
shareholders from their obligations to other stakeholders but, at the same time, 
acknowledged the legitimacy of other stakeholder interests. 
2. Shareholders as Owners 
Berle’s trusteeship argument was based, at its core, on the legal status of 
shareholders as owners of the corporation. This view led Berle famously to characterize 
the public corporation in terms of the separation of ownership and control.59 The 
characterization of shareholders as owners persists in case law and scholarship.60 For 
example, the Delaware Supreme Court explained: 
One of the fundamental tenets of Delaware corporate law provides for a 
separation of control and ownership. The board of directors has the legal 
responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its 
shareholder owners.61
Similarly, Chancellor Allen has recognized the “traditional model of the nature of 
the corporation that sees shareholders as ‘owners.’”62 The model of shareholders as 
owners or principals leads to the argument that the corporation should be managed in 
their interests. Thus Milton Friedman argued that corporate executives did not have the 
authority to sacrifice maximization of profits in favor of social responsibility because the 
executives were merely employees of the owners of the business, the shareholders.63
 57. E. Merrick Dodd, Book Review, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 538, 547 (1942) (reviewing MARSHALL E. DIMOCK 
& HAROLD K. HYDE, BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPORATIONS (1940)). 
 58. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, supra note 39, at 444 n.6 (describing Berle’s subsequent 
statements on the issue); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xii, 
ix-xv (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959) (conceding that corporate law had developed to be consistent with Dodd’s 
position but maintaining his misgivings about whether this was the “‘right’ disposition”). 
 59. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 9 (1932) (referring to shareholders as “owners” and noting that corporate governance must focus on 
the problems caused by the separation of ownership and control). 
 60. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the 
Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 825-26 (1999) (identifying various reasons why shareholders 
should be characterized as owners of the corporation). Prominent economists have also characterized 
shareholders as owners, by virtue of their status as residual claimants and suppliers of physical capital. See, e.g., 
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 695 (1986); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the 
Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765-66 (1989); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of 
the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1119-20 (1990). 
 61. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998). 
 62. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 63. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32. 
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Deeming shareholders to be the owners of the corporation has led to the 
characterization of the shareholder’s interest in terms of property rights.64 Describing the 
corporation as shareholder property is a powerful rhetorical device, because property 
rights convey a sense of absolutism. Thomas Grey explains, “To own property is to have 
exclusive control of something—to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, 
leave it idle, or destroy it.”65 Indeed, at least one scholar has argued that corporate 
constituency statutes, which authorize managers to consider nonshareholder interests, 
may constitute unconstitutional takings by virtue of the fact that they diminish the 
shareholders’ property interests in the corporation.66
The characterization of shareholders as legal owners has been widely criticized.67 
Lynn Stout calls it “the worst[] of the standard arguments for shareholder primacy.”68 
Critics argue that there are substantial legal and practical differences between 
shareholders and traditional property owners.69 From a legal perspective, shareholders 
own stock, which gives them claims to certain control and financial rights within the 
corporation but not direct control over or even access to the firm’s underlying assets. 
Other stakeholders, including creditors, options holders, and managers have claims to 
different control and financial rights. Corporate managers, unlike traditional agents, are 
not directly controlled by their principals in that the source of their power is largely 
statutory. From a practical perspective, shareholders also do not resemble traditional 
owners. They are a fluid and fluctuating group of investors, many of whom hold only 
short-term interests, and perhaps most importantly, they do not exercise the control 
associated with traditional property rights. Berle and Means themselves argued that 
shareholders “by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property . . . 
surrender[] the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest, . . . 
[and] release[] the community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent 
implied in the doctrine of strict property rights.”70
It is not clear, however, that these arguments effectively defeat the ownership 
characterization. Property scholars have largely rejected the absolutist view of property 
rights, recognizing that such rights can be divisible, shared, and contingent.71 Melvin 
Eisenberg observes that “life interests, remainder interests, and easements are property 
rights, not contractual rights, even though they lack some of the standard incidents of 
 64. David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 230-31 (1991) (explaining the idea 
that shareholders hold corporations as property). 
 65. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII, at 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John 
W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 66. Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under 
the Takings Clause, 24 J. CORP. L. 1, 2-3 (1998). 
 67. Contractarians reject the view of shareholders as owners, characterizing their claims as merely 
contractual. Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 825. Communitarians similarly reject shareholders as owners of the 
corporation. Id. 
 68. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 
1190 (2002). 
 69. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4-5 (1995) (describing as misleading the characterization of shareholders as 
owners). 
 70. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 59, at 355-56. 
 71. See, e.g., A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 
1961) (describing the concept of split ownership). 
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ownership.”72 Moreover, the fact that shareholders may be characterized as owners does 
not resolve the question of whether other corporate stakeholders can also claim an 
ownership interest in the corporation. Indeed, property law frequently concerns conflicts 
in which holders of differing interests in the same asset seek to control or use the asset in 
ways that interfere with the each other’s legally protected interests.73 As Joseph Singer 
explains, “In these cases, title and ownership are not helpful ways to conceptualize the 
dispute.”74
Moreover, the scope of property rights does not flow automatically from an 
ownership interest but is a function of underlying political and economic forces. The 
possession of a property interest in an asset does not resolve one’s rights to use or control 
the asset. As Joan Williams explains, “labeling something as property does not 
predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it.”75 Thus, despite its 
appeal, the characterization of a corporation as property doesn’t tell us which 
stakeholders may be deemed to possess an ownership interest; nor does it tell us the legal 
rights associated with that interest. While ownership rights may be a consequence of 
shareholder primacy, they do not justify shareholder primacy. 
Ultimately, the Berle-Dodd debate and the rhetoric of shareholder ownership offer 
insights into the historical foundations of the shareholder primacy norm, but neither 
provides a convincing justification for defining the corporate objective exclusively in 
terms of shareholder wealth. A potential alternative is existing law. In the next section, 
this Article explores the extent to which existing law requires managers to focus 
exclusively on shareholder wealth. 
B. Shareholder Primacy and Existing Law 
Commentators widely recognize that shareholder primacy functions more as a norm 
than an enforceable legal rule.76 Although corporate law mandates managerial fidelity to 
shareholder interests both through shareholder election rights and through fiduciary 
principles, existing law does not actually require officers and directors to make 
operational decisions with the sole objective of shareholder wealth maximization. 
The high point of shareholder primacy as a legal mandate was the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,77 in which the court struck 
down Henry Ford’s plan to use surplus earnings to reduce car prices rather than distribute 
those earnings to shareholders. The court explained: “A business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”78 The modern counterpart of 
 72. Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 825. 
 73. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1283, 1455-56 (1996) (describing how “many disputes about property involve conflicts among title 
holders”). 
 74. Id. at 1456. 
 75. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998). 
 76. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law Symposium: Introduction, 149 
U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1611 (2001) (introducing a symposium exploring “the complex relationship between legal 
and nonlegal enforceability, between ‘law’ and ‘norms’”); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 n.1 (1998) (describing the use of the term “shareholder primacy norm”). 
 77. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 78. Id. at 684. 
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Dodge v. Ford is the Delaware Supreme Court’s Revlon decision.79 In Revlon, the court 
held that “concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among 
active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the 
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”80 Rather, the directors were 
required, in that context, to maximize shareholder value. 
Importantly, however, even in these cases, the directors’ duty to maximize 
shareholder wealth is limited. Although Dodge v. Ford is frequently cited, no modern 
court has struck down an operational decision on the ground that it favors stakeholder 
interests over shareholder interests. Indeed, some commentators argue that Dodge’s 
holding is limited to the close corporation context, and rather than defining appropriate 
corporate objectives, the case should be understood as a precursor to the modern doctrine 
of shareholder oppression.81 The Revlon decision is limited to the corporate control 
context and, even within that context, applies to an extremely small set of cases. The 
court in Revlon explicitly noted that the inevitability of a cash sale changed the role of the 
directors “from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers.”82
Perhaps more significantly, the Revlon court explained that when the board decided 
to put the company up for sale, its duty “changed from the preservation of Revlon as a 
corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the 
stockholders’ benefit.”83 In other words, even in the takeover context, so long as the 
company has not entered the Revlon mode, Delaware law permits directors to consider 
the interests of “creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community 
generally.”84 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained subsequent to the Revlon 
decision in Paramount v. Time, “[A] board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to 
maximize shareholder value.”85 Indeed, the Delaware courts have gone so far as to 
conclude that a board may take actions that affirmatively disadvantage shareholders if the 
board can justify those actions.86
Had Oracle and PeopleSoft not resolved their recent takeover dispute, the Delaware 
courts might have had occasion to consider the question of whether an issuer can protect 
stakeholder interests at the expense of the shareholders. After Oracle made its takeover 
bid, PeopleSoft began including “customer assurance” provisions in its contracts that 
entitled customers to substantial damages if a buyer acquired PeopleSoft and stopped 
servicing the customers.87 The provisions had the effect of making a takeover more 
 79. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 80. Id. at 182. 
 81. Smith, supra note 76, at 322-23; Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A 
Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 256-57 (1999). 
 82. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
 84. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 85. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). 
 86. See Orban v. Field, No.12820, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 277, at *27 (Dec. 30, 1993) (recognizing the 
general principle that “if directors take action directed against a class of securities they should be required to 
justify it”); see also Blackmore Partners, LP v. Link Energy, LLC, 864 A.2d 80, 86 (Del. Ch. 2004) (concluding 
that directors who approved a distribution of 100% of a solvent company’s assets to creditors, wiping out all 
value for the equity holders, may be required to justify their actions). 
 87. See, e.g., David Marcus, Delaware to See Oracle-PeopleSoft Dispute, THE DEAL, Oct. 4, 2004, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1096473931503 (describing PeopleSoft’s use of a “customer assurance 
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difficult—thus hurting shareholders—at the expense of PeopleSoft customers. 
In the operational context, the Delaware statute, which is generally described as 
favoring the interests of shareholders more than the law of other states, does not 
explicitly require that a corporation be managed exclusively or even primarily in the 
interests of its shareholders. The Delaware statute provides that the directors, and not the 
shareholders, have the authority to run the corporation and is silent both with respect to 
the standard by which board decisions are to be evaluated, and with respect to the 
stakeholders whose interests may legitimately be taken into account.88 Delaware appears 
to endorse the right if not the obligation of directors to manage the corporation as a legal 
and economic entity.89
The discretion afforded by the open-ended Delaware statute is increased by the 
application of the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule provides a 
corporation’s officers and directors with broad discretion to consider the interests of other 
stakeholders.90 Significantly, the Delaware courts have described the business judgment 
rule as imposing an obligation to act “in the best interests of the company,”91 not the best 
interests of the shareholders. The scope of protection for board decisions is further 
enhanced to the degree that the charter exculpates the directors for breaches of the duty of 
care.92 The combined effect of the business judgment rule and director exculpation 
provisions is to limit most fiduciary duty claims to breaches of the duty of loyalty, that is, 
manager self-dealing. Moreover, the courts have made clear that the shareholders do not 
have the power either to make operational decisions or to impose their vision of the 
corporate good upon a board that disagrees with that assessment. 
Shareholders do, of course, have the power to exercise control rights under 
Delaware law, most significantly, to elect the board of directors and to vote on certain 
other corporate transactions.93 Arguably, management accountability to shareholders, 
through these control rights, should result in management decisions that maximize 
shareholder value. Importantly, however, these control rights are not exclusive to 
plan”). 
 88. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005) (providing that the corporation's business and affairs “shall 
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”). 
 89. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 261, 276 (1992). It is important to note that this conception cannot readily be explained as simply a 
“long-term” obligation to maximize shareholder value. Modern finance theory suggests that current stock price 
should reflect the long-term benefits to shareholders of considering the interests of other corporate stakeholders. 
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 
304 (1999) (rejecting shareholder long-run interest as an explanation for consideration of nonshareholder 
stakeholders). 
 90. See Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at 306 (terming these “mixed motive situations” in that the board 
may be benefiting other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders and arguing that courts generally uphold 
such operational decisions under deferential business judgment rule analysis); Bratton, supra note 50, at 1457 
(stating that the business judgment rule grants management “considerable latitude to derogate from the 
shareholder primacy norm as it makes decisions respecting investment, financing, and operations”). 
 91. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (authorizing such exculpation). 
 93. Blair and Stout argue that shareholders enjoy voting rights “as partial compensation for . . . [their] 
unique vulnerabilities,” which include lack of involvement in the corporation’s day-to-day activities, limited 
access to information about firm operations, and collective action problems. Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at 
314. 
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common shareholders.94 Preferred shareholders exercise control rights, and Delaware 
law explicitly permits corporations to grant rights to creditors in addition to or even in 
place of shareholder voting rights.95
Additionally, shareholder control rights are limited and largely indirect. 
Shareholders cannot initiate transactions or make operational decisions; their power is 
limited to vetoing certain types of extraordinary corporate decisions such as mergers and 
dissolutions. Similarly, while shareholders nominally have the right to elect directors, 
their limited power over the nominating process and the corporate proxy machinery 
prevent shareholders from using their voting rights to demand shareholder primacy from 
directors.96
In considering the protection of nonshareholder constituencies under Delaware law, 
it is important to distinguish between two related concepts: the permissible objectives for 
management decision-making and the enforcement of fiduciary duties. The Delaware 
courts have explicitly rejected the argument that management has a fiduciary obligation 
to other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders,97 at least as long as the corporation 
is not operating in the vicinity of insolvency. Consequently, stakeholders cannot initiate 
litigation to require that management consider their interests. The fact that only 
shareholders can judicially enforce fiduciary duties does not mean, however, that 
directors must make decisions solely in the interests of shareholders, a point that will be 
considered further in Part IV below.98 Similarly, the cases that reject stakeholder claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty do not forbid management from favoring stakeholder 
interests; they simply provide that management’s failure to favor such interests is not 
judicially remediable. 
Although the shareholder primacy norm is used to describe corporate objectives 
nationally, not just in Delaware, states other than Delaware have endorsed broader 
conceptions of firm value for the purposes of managerial decision-making.99 The 
majority of states have adopted corporate constituency statutes that explicitly authorize 
 94. But see Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that “a corporate structure in 
which the bondholders . . . have all the voting rights, and the shareholders . . . have no voting rights, is 
anomalous”). 
 95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221. 
 96. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at 310-12 (describing limited shareholder ability to use their 
voting rights effectively); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 
(2003) (identifying limitations in meaningful shareholder access and proposing remedies). 
 97. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988) (holding that a corporate bond does “not 
represent an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with 
concomitant fiduciary duties”). 
 98. Indeed, as Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have observed, the law provides that the recovery in a 
derivative suit that successfully establishes a breach of management’s fiduciary duty to shareholders is payable, 
not to those shareholders, but to the corporation itself, where its benefits “accrue to all the corporation’s 
stakeholders.” Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at 295. 
 99. Indeed, if one extends the analysis globally, the corporate laws of other countries expressly reject the 
shareholder primacy norm. See, e.g., Peer C. Fiss & Edward J. Zajac, The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested 
Terrain: The (Non)Adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation Among German Firms, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 501, 
503 (2004) (“[T]he original German corporate law of 1937, which stated that the company was to be managed 
for the good of the enterprise and its employees (Gefolgschaft), the common wealth of the citizens (Volk) and 
the State (Reich).”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2072-75 (2001) (explaining the role of shareholder primacy in France and Germany). 
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directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders.100 Although these 
statutes were adopted in response to hostile tender offers and several are limited to the 
change of control context, the vast majority apply to all operational decisions. In many 
cases, the statutes explicitly provide that directors will not be required to regard the 
effects of a corporate decision on any particular group—including shareholders—as a 
dominant factor.101 As former SEC Commissioner Al Sommer has observed, the salient 
point of these statutes is that they define the best interests of the corporation in terms of 
the interests of both shareholders and nonshareholder stakeholders, thereby omitting any 
requirement that decisions favoring nonshareholder stakeholders be justified in terms of a 
nexus to shareholder value.102
It is true that the statutes—other than that of Connecticut—do not require directors 
to favor other stakeholders, nor do they impose fiduciary obligations on directors in favor 
of nonshareholder constituencies.103 Nonetheless, the plain language of the statutes is 
inconsistent with the shareholder primacy norm. In some cases, statutory provisions 
extend even further. For example, the New York Business Corporation Law authorizes 
corporations to make charitable donations “irrespective of corporate benefit.”104 There is 
also ample case law rejecting an affirmative obligation on the part of directors to sacrifice 
the interests of other constituencies in order to maximize shareholder wealth. As the court 
explained in GAF v. Union Carbide Corp.,105 the board must balance investors’ interests, 
on the one hand, and “the legitimate concerns and interests of employees and 
management . . . on the other.”106 The point is not that constituency statutes prohibit 
managers from maximizing shareholder value, but simply that they do not require it. 
C. Shareholder Primacy and Business Practice 
Terming shareholder primacy a “norm” implies that, as a practical matter, directors 
seek to maximize shareholder wealth even if they do not face a legally enforceable 
obligation to do so. Indeed, there are widespread claims that the shareholder primacy 
model dominates the MBA curriculum and that the shareholder primacy norm is an 
accurate description of business practice. Recent interview research conducted by the 
Aspen Institute Business and Society Program, for example, found that the norm of 
shareholder wealth maximization was implicit in most business school courses, and so 
 100. See Subramanian, supra note 34, at 1801 (identifying 31 states that have adopted corporate 
constituency statutes). 
 101. See IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2005). 
 102. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty 
Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 42 (1991). 
 103. The Connecticut constituency statute affirmatively requires directors, in the context of evaluating 
certain corporate transactions, including mergers and other business combinations, to consider the interests of 
nonshareholder constituencies. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2004) (stating that “a director . . . shall 
consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation . . . the 
interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and . . . community and societal 
considerations”) (emphasis added). 
 104. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (Gould 2006). Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Kahn v. 
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 63 (Del. 1991), held that the appropriate standard to be applied in reviewing a corporate 
charitable donation was whether the donation constituted waste. 
 105. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 106. Id. at 1019-20. 
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powerful that it did not need to be defended.107
Other scholars have questioned the claim that the shareholder primacy norm 
dominates business practice, however. After compiling website and survey data from 
both U.S. and foreign firms, Petra Joerg, Claudio Loderer, Lukas Roth, and Urs Waelchli 
found a surprising unwillingness of managers even to identify shareholder wealth 
maximization as a priority.108 Because talk is cheap, the authors concluded that this 
finding reflects “a lack of commitment to the goal of shareholder-value 
maximization.”109 Similarly, Lisa Fairfax has found that corporations are increasingly 
embracing stakeholder rhetoric110 and that a similar trend is occurring in business school 
curricula.111
Stephen Bainbridge has argued that the business world itself seems to favor director 
primacy over shareholder primacy.112 Lynn Stout has identified a variety of standard 
business practices—options repricings, retroactive increases in employee retirement 
benefits, and corporate charitable contributions—in which shareholder interests are 
subordinated to those of other stakeholders.113 Daines and Klausner have even found 
cases in which corporations in states that lacked statutory nonshareholder constituency 
provisions, such as Delaware, adopted such provisions in their charters.114
Performance-based compensation arguably creates the greatest incentive for 
corporate decision-makers to focus on shareholder wealth maximization. The dramatic 
growth since the early 1990s of performance-based compensation, particularly stock 
options, would seem to provide circumstantial evidence that shareholder wealth 
maximization has become increasingly important to management. Yet a careful analysis 
of executive compensation demonstrates that, although stock options appear designed to 
increase the correlation between shareholder wealth and executive pay, in reality pay has 
largely been decoupled from firm performance. As Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried 
explain, equity-based compensation plans that, in principle, were designed to align 
management incentives, “have enabled executives to reap substantial rewards even when 
their performance was merely passable or even poor.”115
 107. Mary D. Gentile, The Aspen Inst. Bus. & Soc’y Program, Corporate Governance and Accountability: 
What Do We Know and What Do We Teach Future Business Leaders?, Address at the European Academy of 
Business in Society's Third Annual Colloquium 3-4 (Sept. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.caseplace.org/references/references_show.htm?doc_id=306381. 
 108. Petra Joerg et al., The Purpose of the Corporation: Shareholder-Value Maximization? 23 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst. Fin., Working Paper No. 95/2005, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=690044. 
 109. Id. at 24. 
 110. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate 
Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 781-84 (2006). 
 111. Id. at 782. 
 112. Bainbridge, supra note 4. 
 113. Stout, supra note 68, at 1202-03. 
 114. See Daines & Klausner, supra note 40, at 97 (describing the adoption of explicit nonshareholder 
constituency provisions or control share acquisition provisions by 14 of 52 IPO firms in their sample). 
 115. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7 (2004). Moreover, there is evidence that strong performance incentives can 
increase earnings management. See Marcia Millon Cornett et al., Earnings Management, Corporate 
Governance, and True Financial Performance 17-18 (2006) (unpublished paper), available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=886142 (finding that options based compensation increases earnings management and 
that adjustments for likely earnings management may eliminate positive correlation between option 
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Admittedly, managers frequently defend controversial business decisions in terms of 
shareholder value. It is unclear, however, whether those statements are more than 
rhetoric. Moreover, management public statements are directed to investors, who are 
obviously highly concerned about shareholder primacy. Regardless of management 
priorities, managers are likely to espouse investor concerns in investor-oriented public 
statements. 
D. Economic Arguments for Shareholder Primacy 
Law and economics scholars offer a twofold normative defense of shareholder 
primacy. First, they argue that, from a contractual perspective, shareholder primacy is 
simply the objective to which the corporation’s constituencies have agreed. Second, they 
argue that shareholder primacy leads to economic efficiency. 
Contractarian scholars describe the corporation as a hypothetical contract in which 
shareholders provide capital and other stakeholders provide other inputs, such as 
labor.116 Under a contractarian approach, the parties to the corporate contract are 
understood to have agreed that the corporation is to be run so as to maximize shareholder 
wealth. If the corporation is a private enterprise, the efficiency of corporate law should be 
measured by the extent to which it maximizes the achievement of the parties’ 
contractually specified objectives. 
The standard economic literature identifies two key differences between the rights of 
shareholders and those of other corporate stakeholders. First, nonshareholder 
stakeholders receive a fixed claim, while shareholders have a residual claim—they 
receive the surplus. Second, the fixed claimants have priority over shareholders—the 
right to have their claims paid in full—and shareholders receive what is left over after the 
fixed claimants are paid. 
Although shareholder primacy has not been formalized into an explicit contractual 
term—either through legislation or in the corporate charter—these differences provide 
justifications for viewing shareholder primacy as an implied term of the contract. First, 
and foremost, a contractual right to receive surplus is of little value if managers have no 
obligation to generate a surplus and are free to pay out all revenues to other corporate 
stakeholders. Second, shareholder primacy is a partial substitute for the priority that other 
stakeholders enjoy. In particular, shareholder primacy adds to the upside potential of the 
residual claim, which compensates shareholders for bearing greater risk than fixed 
claimants. Third, shareholders are passive investors. Through their control, other 
stakeholders, particularly management, can protect their priority interests directly. 
Fourth, shareholder primacy serves as a gap-filler. A contract that fully specified 
management’s decision-making obligations with respect to shareholders would be 
impossibly complex and arguably too inflexible to respond to developments in the 
business world. 
Finally, shareholders cannot withdraw their investment from the corporation without 
substantial sacrifice. Managers, employees, creditors, and suppliers provide input to the 
corporation on an ongoing basis. Thus market forces, in addition to contract terms,  
compensation and performance). 
 116. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1418 (1989) (describing the corporation as “a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts”). 
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constrain the corporation’s ability to exploit these stakeholders. In contrast, a shareholder 
provides permanent capital to the corporation. Although shareholders can exit the 
corporation if their interests are not adequately protected, they can do so only by selling 
their shares to another investor, and the market price for those shares will reflect the risk 
of shareholder exploitation.117 As a result, they will bear the costs of misdeeds or self-
dealing by other stakeholders even if they exit. 
This effect is demonstrated in cases in which states have adopted extreme 
antitakeover legislation. Several states have adopted antitakeover statutes that are widely 
viewed as unduly interfering with the market for corporate control, including Ohio, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.118 Commentators widely agree that these statutes harm 
shareholders by (1) reducing the ability of the takeover market to discipline management 
decision-making and (2) making a takeover, with its likely premium for shareholders, less 
probable. These effects are supported by empirical work that shows a negative impact on 
stock price. The stock price of affected firms drops because the market anticipates the 
effect of these harms on the future value of the stock. Significantly, however, existing 
shareholders in these firms are the group that suffers the harm from the legislation. 
Shareholders cannot avoid the harm through exit because, once the legislation is adopted 
or even proposed, the price of existing shares falls to reflect the anticipated harm. 
The extent of shareholder primacy supported by the contractual analysis is 
somewhat limited. It can be argued that shareholders have bargained for a risk-adjusted 
market rate of return on their investment, and that the terms of the corporate contract are 
silent as to the appropriate allocation of any surplus. Contract theory suggests that 
shareholders would not contribute capital unless operational decisions included a 
shareholder value objective, but, in practice, shareholders are more likely to be concerned 
with the level of return on their investment than their claim, relative to other stakeholders, 
to the firm’s surplus. A firm with high fixed costs may allocate its entire surplus to 
shareholders and still pay those shareholders a lower return than a competitor that gives 
greater weight to stakeholder interests. In addition, as indicated above, the implicit 
contract provides management with considerable discretion to choose among business 
strategies. 
It is important to distinguish the contractual argument from the normative argument 
that shareholder primacy leads to economic efficiency. As Jeff Gordon explains: 
Seen from an economic perspective, the goal of a system of corporate 
governance is to maximize the economic value of the firm, as measured by the 
total of economic returns for all possible residual claimants. For instance, the 
goal is to maximize the sum of the returns for shareholders, debt claimants, and 
workers. The ultimate defense of the assignment in the Anglo-American system 
of exclusive governance rights to the stockholders rests on the empirically 
contestable fact that this is how to maximize the size of the economic pie.119
 117. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and 
Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83 (2004) (arguing that the market will cause the price of minority shares in a 
controlled corporation to reflect the risk of self-dealing by the controlling shareholder). 
 118. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 13, at 1804-05 (listing states that have adopted “extreme takeover 
statutes”). 
 119. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, and the Transition Costs of 
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At its core, the economic argument is based on a truism. If stockholders are the 
residual claimants, by definition they receive the surplus that remains after all fixed 
claims are paid. Maximizing this surplus means maximizing total firm value, assuming 
that other stakeholder values remain unchanged. Consequently, maximizing firm value is 
the equivalent of maximizing shareholder value. Law and economics scholars argue that 
this approach gives residual claimants the appropriate incentives to maximize firm value. 
This theory, in turn, leads to the argument for vesting control rights in shareholders. 
Three components of this analysis deserve further scrutiny. First, is it true that 
shareholders are the exclusive residual claimants in the firm? Second, is it possible to 
maximize the value of the firm to the residual claimants without affecting the value of 
other stakeholder interests? Third, does maximizing firm value lead to economic 
efficiency? 
As Amir Licht observes, the assumption that the interests of all fixed claimants, that 
is, all nonshareholder constituencies, are fixed and well-defined, is unrealistic. Rather, 
“the corporate enterprise comprises several constituencies whose interests are both 
interdependent and indeterminate.”120 Residual claimants are simply, by definition, those 
who receive a share of the firm’s surplus. Shareholders are not the only stakeholders with 
a claim to the firm’s surplus.121 Indeed, nonshareholder stakeholders frequently have an 
explicit contractual claim on a portion of the surplus. Creditors can receive a share of 
profits instead of a fixed rate of interest. Managers and employees can receive 
performance-based compensation rather than fixed salaries.122 Customers can receive a 
share of firm surplus through price cuts or rebates. Lynn Stout has argued that even 
absent an explicit contractual claim to the firm’s surplus, nonshareholder stakeholders are 
accurately described as residual claimants in the sense that they enjoy extra-contractual 
benefits when the corporation does well, and suffer, along with shareholders, when the 
corporation does poorly.123
At the same time, options, warrants, and other derivative securities enable investors 
to restructure the scope of the residual claim. Thomas Smith has argued that out of the 
money call option holders, who have little more than a bet on the firm’s future stock 
Capitalism, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 185, 197 (1998). 
 120. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 652 (2004). 
 121. Nor, perhaps, is it fully accurate to describe shareholders as residual claimants. Although shareholders 
have a theoretical claim on the firm’s surplus, they have no actual entitlement either to the distribution of 
surplus or to control the allocation of surplus between themselves and contractual claimants, outside the context 
of bankruptcy. See Stout, supra note 68, at 1193-94 (“[A]s a legal matter, shareholders of a public corporation 
are entitled to receive nothing from the firm unless and until the board of directors decides that they should 
receive it.”). 
 122. Indeed, one might argue that the shift toward greater performance-based compensation for 
management has converted managers into residual claimants, resulting in a form of managerial capitalism. 
Performance-based compensation has, of course, been justified on the basis that it reduces agency costs and 
properly incentivizes management to maximize firm productivity. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
871, 898 (2002) (describing the evolution of the poison pill together with shifts in executive compensation 
during the period after the pill was developed); cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 39 (arguing that 
managerial capitalism has been correlated with reduced productivity). 
 123. Stout, supra note 68, at 1194. 
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price, are in fact the ultimate residual claimants.124 In contrast, hedging enables a 
shareholder to reduce or eliminate the scope of the residual interest while maintaining 
shareholder status. Frank Partnoy describes a variety of financial innovations that have 
led to the mutability of the residual claim, complicating the case for defining corporate 
objectives in terms of the interests of the residual claimants.125
Additionally, the scope of protection afforded to stakeholder interests depends on 
the quality of contractual protection. As Jeffrey Gordon has observed, the relationship of 
shareholder value to firm value is a function of the strength of the various markets in 
which the corporation participates, including the capital market, the labor market, and the 
product market.126 Jensen and Meckling recognized that the nexus of contracts theory of 
the corporation includes all the “owners of labor, material and capital inputs.”127 The 
failure of the shareholder primacy model to explicitly address stakeholder interests is 
premised on the assumption that stakeholders are protected by contract. This assumption 
proves problematic to the extent that stakeholder contracts are deficient. Indeed, scholars 
have identified extensive evidence that stakeholder contracts are neither complete nor 
perfectly priced.128 Ramesh Rao notes, for example, that contracts with nonshareholder 
stakeholders are often illiquid and lack both hedging options and market valuations.129 
George Constantinides identifies particular elements of the risk associated with an 
employee’s investment in a firm—the risk of job loss is uninsurable, persistent, and 
counter-cyclical.130 To the extent that stakeholder contracts are imperfect or incomplete, 
stakeholders may retain a residual interest as well as a fixed claim. 
If the interests of fixed claimants are not fully protected by contract, increasing 
shareholder value may not increase the size of the corporate pie. Although shareholders 
can benefit from increasing productivity, they can also benefit by transferring value from 
fixed claimants to themselves. Perhaps the most obvious type of transfer is increasing the 
level of risk. Residual claimants may prefer excessive levels of risk in a corporation, 
particularly when their expected return is small in the absence of that risk.131 Because 
 124. Smith, supra note 81, at 260-61; see also Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 SMU L. REV. 141, 150 (2002) (stating “the most 
residual claims are equivalent to barely in-the-money call options”). Smith’s claim might be stronger with 
respect to warrant holders than for option holders. But see In re New Valley Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 17649-
NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 107, at *18-19 (June 28, 2004) (rejecting the argument that the warrant holder had a 
comparable legal interest to a stockholder). 
 125. Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation and Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 799 (2006). 
 126. See Gordon, supra note 38. 
 127. Michael Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976). 
 128. See, e.g., Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: 
An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1988) (explaining how, in internal labor markets, “a bilateral monopoly replaces the 
textbook model of competitive supply and demand . . . [and] . . . asymmetric information and strategic behavior 
allow for inefficient outcomes”). But see Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with 
Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1065-68 (1984) (identifying and rejecting 
reasons why labor markets might be less efficient than capital markets). 
 129. Ramesh K.S. Rao, The Value of the Firm as a Nexus of Heterogeneous Contracts 3 (Feb. 1, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=624101. 
 130. George Constantinides, Rational Asset Prices, 57 J. FIN. 1567, 1575-76 (2002). 
 131. Thomas A. Smith, supra note 81, at 221-24 (offering an example of inefficiently risky investment and 
FISCH FINAL.DOC 9/1/2006  11:00:24 AM 
660 The Journal of Corporation Law [Spring 
 
residual claimants are, in essence, gambling with value that would otherwise be paid to 
fixed claimants, their interests conflict with those of other corporate stakeholders.132 
Even when a corporation is financially sound, increasing the level of risk to further the 
interests of shareholders may harm other stakeholders.  Greater risk may reduce the 
creditworthiness of the firm and hence the value of its debt, or reduce job security, 
thereby reducing the value of the firm to its workers. 
If nonshareholders can be residual claimants or corporate decisions can transfer 
value between stakeholders, then maximizing shareholder value is not the equivalent of 
maximizing firm value. Careful economic scholars have made this point explicitly. 
Michael Jensen, for example, observes that management is continually forced to make 
tradeoffs among different corporate constituencies.133 Jensen explicitly argues that firm 
value should be defined to include “the sum of the values of all financial claims on the 
firm—debt, warrants, and preferred stock, as well as equity.”134 He then argues that 
tradeoffs between other constituencies must be addressed by assessing their effect on 
long-term firm value, with no stakeholder obtaining “full satisfaction.”135
The relationship between firm value and social welfare raises another efficiency 
question. Jensen explains that “200 years’ worth of work in economics and finance 
indicate that social welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy attempt to 
maximize their own total firm value.”136 Others have questioned this claim, however, 
identifying a variety of conditions under which maximizing firm welfare need not be 
efficient.137 A particular concern is that individual firm decisions may create negative 
externalities.138 Although the markets in which a firm operates may impose a certain 
level of discipline, the extent of that discipline depends, again, on the quality of the 
markets. For example, Mark Roe demonstrates that maximizing firm value will be 
socially wasteful in the absence of sufficiently competitive product markets because 
monopoly firms will sacrifice consumer surplus.139 Scholars have debated, and will 
continue to debate, the extent to which corporate laws, as opposed to other forms of 
regulation, should resolve problems such as externalities and monopoly.140 Nonetheless, 
then extending the analysis beyond the “vicinity of insolvency”). Smith has also argued that the interests of a 
modern diversified investor are more appropriate than those of a hypothetical long-term shareholder in defining 
the firm’s objectives. Robert Monks takes a similar view in his conception of a “Global Investor” for whom no 
societal effect is an externality. ROBERT A.G. MONKS, THE NEW GLOBAL INVESTORS: HOW SHAREOWNERS 
CAN UNLOCK SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY WORLDWIDE 105 (2001). 
 132. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A 
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77 (1995) 
(explaining why equity holders have an incentive to shift assets to risky investments and how this shift 
constitutes a transfer of wealth from the fixed to the residual claimants). 
 133. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 
14 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2001). 
 134. Id. at 8. 
 135. Id. at 16. 
 136. Id. at 11. 
 137. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith, supra note 81, at 221 (arguing that “the shareholder value maximization 
norm, if strictly applied, would require firm managers to make socially inefficient choices”); Stout, supra note 
68, at 1197-98 (demonstrating how shareholder primacy can lead to inefficient outcomes). 
 138. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 38 (describing potential externality effect of firm-specific decisions). 
 139. Roe, supra note 22, at 2071. 
 140. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 133, at 17 (arguing that monopoly and externality problems should be 
FISCH FINAL.DOC 9/1/2006  11:00:24 AM 
2006] Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law 661 
 
to the extent that these problems exist, they temper the strength of the efficiency 
argument. 
One can defend shareholder primacy as an efficient decisional guide. A major 
drawback to stakeholder theory is that it lacks a specific maximand to guide managerial 
discretion.141 To the extent that the interests of different stakeholders conflict, the 
stakeholder model offers no principled basis for choosing among them.142 In contrast, 
shareholder primacy is said to offer management a way to evaluate decisions within the 
framework of a single-valued objective function. As Michael Jensen has explained, a 
corporate objective function that embraces stakeholder interests will likely result in 
“managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency, and perhaps even competitive failure.”143
Here too, however, superiority of the shareholder primacy norm is overstated, 
primarily because shareholders are not a homogenous group.144 Within the shareholder 
class, the investors vary considerably among such dimensions as the time frame over 
which they invest, the extent to which they trade versus passively holding the 
corporation’s stock, their degree of diversification, the extent to which they hold non-
equity interests in the issuer, any option or other hedging positions that they hold, and so 
forth. Scholarly commentary has recognized that the interests of short and long-term 
shareholders may differ and that, consequently, they may prefer different management 
decisions. Indeed, managers have criticized institutional investors for unduly 
emphasizing short-term corporate performance. Scholars have also noted the conflicting 
interests of current and future shareholders.145 Options and other financial derivatives 
further blur these lines, as they allow investors to refine the time period of their 
investment and the scope of risk reflected in that investment.146
The economic argument in response is that shareholder primacy is not defined by 
reference to specific shareholders, but reflects the theoretical interests of a hypothetical 
long-term equity holder. The problem, for both managers and scholars, is that absent 
perfect market efficiency, short-term performance and value indicators, such as 
profitability and stock price, may not accurately reflect the long-term value of operational 
decisions.147 Thus, if the notion of shareholder primacy is refined in this way, 
shareholder primacy becomes less useful, both as a decisional rule and as a tool of 
resolved by the government in its rule-setting function). 
 141. See Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 47, at 354 (criticizing stakeholder theory for the idea “that 
managers should juggle multiple goals in a complex hierarchy”). 
 142. See Jensen, supra note 133, at 13 (“Obviously any decision criterion—and the objective function is at 
the core of any decision criterion—must specify how to make the tradeoffs between these demands.”). 
 143. Id. at 9. 
 144. Sundarum and Inkpen highlight the problem of heterogenous interests with respect to stakeholders, but 
do not acknowledge that the same problem applies to shareholders. See Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 47, at 
353 (criticizing stakeholder advocates for ignoring the differences within stakeholder groups such as 
employees). 
 145. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and 
Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005). 
 146. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the 
Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1286-87 (1991) (arguing that financial innovation has 
made the shareholder primacy norm “intolerably ambiguous”). 
 147. See, e.g., Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively 
Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 798-800 (2003) (explaining reasons why stock price may diverge from firm’s 
intrinsic value). 
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empirical analysis. The consequences of this result will be explored in Part V below. 
IV. THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
A. The Scope of Fiduciary Duties 
Although, as described in Part III, the shareholder primacy norm has limited effect 
as a legal constraint on operational decisions, it nonetheless occupies a key role in 
defining the scope of judicially enforceable fiduciary duties. Despite the protection of the 
business judgment rule, corporate law limits management discretion through the 
imposition of fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 
Fiduciary duties operate as supra-contractual constraints on management decision-
making by triggering open-ended judicial review. Cases on fiduciary duties are an 
important source of law dealing with fairness, procedural protection, and the appropriate 
balance of power among corporate constituencies.148 Courts have generally described 
fiduciary duties as running to the corporation and/or its shareholders. Nonetheless, the 
right to trigger this judicial intervention rests exclusively with the shareholders. It is a 
fundamental principle of corporate law that, absent extraordinary circumstances,149 
fiduciary principles do not protect nonshareholder stakeholders. Only shareholders can 
bring a lawsuit to address a director or officer breach of fiduciary duty. 
The argument that corporate law endorses shareholder primacy flows readily from 
the legal limits on enforcement of fiduciary duties. By vesting shareholders with the 
exclusive right to enforce these constraints on management, corporate law appears to 
define the corporate objective exclusively in terms of shareholder welfare. This definition 
has led stakeholder theorists or “progressive” corporate law scholars to criticize the 
exclusion of other stakeholders from the protection of judicially enforceable fiduciary 
duties, and to seek an obligation of management to consider stakeholder interests in cases 
in which those interests conflict with those of the shareholders. Toward this end, 
stakeholder theorists advocate the extension of fiduciary protection to nonshareholder 
stakeholders.150 In practice, this extension means expanded litigation rights. 
Debate over the appropriate scope of fiduciary duties continues to flourish, and a 
summary of the arguments is beyond the scope of this Article. Despite its claim that the 
shareholder primacy norm reflects too narrow a conception of firm value, this Article 
 148. Importantly, the role of courts in articulating these rules is likely the most significant output of 
fiduciary duty litigation, in that corporate decision-makers rarely face liability for a breach of fiduciary duty. 
See Bernard S. Black et al., Outside Director Liability (Before Enron and WorldCom) (Stanford Law and Econ. 
Olin Working Paper No. 250, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=382422 (“[O]utside directors of U.S. 
public companies face a tiny risk of actual liability for good faith (non-self-interested) conduct, no matter how 
careless or reckless they are.”). 
 149. Creditors are protected with fiduciary duties when the corporation is in the “zone of insolvency.” See, 
e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank v. Pathe Commc’ns, No. 12150, 1991 LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) 
(recognizing this protection). 
 150. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (1992) (arguing in favor of a fiduciary duty to bondholders); Marleen A. O'Connor, 
Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced 
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991) (advocating a fiduciary duty to displaced workers in the context of plant 
closings). 
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does not challenge—and indeed endorses—the limitation of fiduciary protection to 
shareholders. Rather, it questions the inference about the appropriate measure of firm 
value that shareholder theorists draw from the scope of fiduciary duty. In the following 
subsection, this Article identifies a new argument supporting the limited scope of 
fiduciary duties—institutional specialization. This Article argues that the scope of 
fiduciary duties is not a statement that shareholder interests should be privileged above 
those of other corporate constituencies; shareholder interests are not the only interests 
that count. Rather, fiduciary duties are a mechanism for allocating protection of 
constituency interests through institutional specialization. 
B. Institutional Specialization and Fiduciary Principles 
Corporate law devotes its primary focus to the agency problems created by conflicts 
of interest—conflicts between shareholders and managers, between controlling and 
minority shareholders, and between shareholders and other stakeholders.151 As Reinier 
Kraakman and his co-authors explain, a core function of corporate law involves 
minimizing “value-reducing forms of opportunism among the constituencies of the 
corporate enterprise.”152 Conflicts between shareholders and managers have dominated 
the analysis. This is largely due to the paradigm-shifting work of Berle and Means in 
identifying the agency problem of strong managers and weak dispersed shareholders 
resulting from the separation of ownership and control in the public corporation.153 
Stakeholder analysis highlights a second conflict—between the interests of shareholders 
and other stakeholders. 
In corporate law, academic commentary has analyzed the relative merits of different 
institutional mechanisms for addressing these conflicts. Most famously, in the classic 
Cary-Winter debate over regulatory competition, former SEC commissioner William 
Cary argued that the dominance of Delaware as a corporate domicile—and thus the 
source of state corporate law for more than half of all publicly traded U.S. corporations—
reflected the appeal of Delaware’s law to corporate management.154 Finding that 
management power over the choice of domicile had resulted in a lax statute that failed to 
provide shareholders with optimal protection from management malfeasance and self-
dealing,155 Cary called for the adoption of federal minimum standards of corporate 
responsibility.156 Cary’s conclusions were challenged by Judge Ralph Winter.157 Winter 
argued that various market constraints, including the capital markets, disciplined 
managers and prevented them from exploiting shareholders through inefficiently lax 
corporate law.158
 151. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 2 (2004). 
 152. Id. 
 153. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 59. 
 154. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 670 
(1974). 
 155. Cary therefore termed regulatory competition a “race to the bottom.” Id. at 705. 
 156. Id. at 701. 
 157. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
 158. Instead, Winter argued, market discipline caused regulatory competition to produce a “race to the top.” 
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The appropriate allocation of corporate regulation among different lawmaking 
institutions depends on an assessment of comparative institutional competence. As Neil 
Komesar demonstrated, comparative institutional analysis should consider the strengths 
and weaknesses of competing institutional regulators relative to each other.159 Komesar 
argued that a choice among lawmaking institutions, such as Congress, the courts, and the 
market, requires a careful examination of the particular characteristics of each institution 
coupled with an assessment of that institution’s ability, relative to other institutions, to 
achieve a particular policy objective. Factors that affect relative institutional competence 
include the susceptibility of an institution to interest group pressure that may result in 
minoritarian bias, the contrasting risk of majoritarian bias, transaction costs and other 
factors that may impact the ability of those affected to participate in institutional debate, 
and the complexity of the issues involved. 
Because of the range of institutional players, comparative institutional analysis is 
particularly applicable to corporate law.  One study that applies the methodology, 
although not the terminology, is Roberta Romano’s book, The Genius of American 
Corporate Law.160 Romano identifies a variety of institutional factors that make 
Delaware institutionally superior, as a provider of corporate law, both to other states and 
to the federal government. These factors include Delaware’s small size, its dependence 
on franchise taxes, its specialized court system, and the role of its corporate bar. Romano 
argues, for example, that Delaware’s dependence on franchise taxes causes it to be 
responsive to the need for legal reform because of the significant cost of losing charter 
business to other states. Both Delaware’s specialized courts and its unique corporate bar, 
which plays a substantial role in revising corporate legislation, enable Delaware to 
address the complexity of corporate law, and reduce the transaction costs of regulatory 
change. 
Romano’s work can be extended in two directions. First, it is worthwhile to look 
more carefully at the institutions within Delaware and other states and to consider the 
relative competence of courts, legislatures, and the market in supplying corporate law. 
Second, these institutions can be evaluated based on their ability to protect particular 
corporate constituencies. Comparative institutional analysis demonstrates that courts are 
uniquely positioned to protect the interests of corporate shareholders. This insight, in 
turn, explains the exclusion of nonshareholder constituencies from access to judicial 
lawmaking as a mechanism for institutional specialization. 
Fiduciary duties provide shareholders with access to the courts to challenge 
management decisions. Why do shareholders need recourse to the judicial system to 
address the management-shareholder conflict? A key reason is the limited power of 
shareholders, relative to management, with respect to legislative lawmaking. Public 
company stock in the United States is owned, directly or indirectly, by dispersed small 
shareholders.161 Small stakes and collective action problems limit the effectiveness of 
Id. Judge Winter subsequently conceded the race to the top might, in fact, merely be a “leisurely walk.” Ralph 
K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1530 (1989). 
 159. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 160. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
 161. Even the growth in institutional shareholders does not change this, as most institutions such as pension 
and mutual funds are simply vehicles through which small investors hold stock indirectly. 
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investors to access the legislative process. Cost considerations, agency problems, and 
their own political vulnerability limit the ability of even institutional investors with 
comparatively larger stakes to overcome these problems. Additionally, because much 
corporate law is enacted at the state level, shareholders lack even the minimum political 
power that they might otherwise be able to exert through the voting process. Although 
Delaware supplies corporate law to more than half of all publicly traded companies, few 
investors have the power to vote on the election of Delaware legislators.162
In contrast, corporate managers have significant advantages. Because lobbying, 
testifying before Congress, and other forms of participation in the political process are 
part of managers’ operational responsibilities, managers function as repeat players and 
are able to draw upon their experience and reputations in the legislative process.163 
Managers have substantial firm-specific stakes that make political activity cost-effective 
in contrast to diversified investors. Managers also control the powerful financial 
resources of businesses, causing their interests to be of greater concern to politicians. 
Corporations pay substantial yearly franchise taxes to Delaware—revenue that Delaware 
risks losing if its corporate law fails to remain attractive to corporate management.164 
Through the consumption of legal services, corporations provide substantial revenue to 
key interest groups, such as Delaware corporate lawyers.  Managers may exploit their 
firm’s political capital for their personal benefit. In particular, Romano notes that, in 
addition to possessing higher stakes, managers can use corporate funds to pay their 
lobbying expenditures.165
Although the SEC appears to view its function as one of investor protection, similar 
factors limit the SEC’s ability to address deficiencies in state law through its rule-making 
authority.166 An analysis of the SEC’s institutional competence is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but institutional characteristics such as expertise, the potential for industry 
capture, the extent of agency independence versus susceptibility to political influence, 
and the explicitly and implicitly delegated scope of rule-making authority are all relevant 
to this issue. Because interest groups such as managers, corporate lawyers, and securities 
analysts are small in size and have concentrated stakes, they are able to dominate the 
regulatory agenda and obtain legislation that favors their interests over those of dispersed 
investors.167 Romano identifies the Williams Act and mandatory disclosure as examples 
 162. In addition, as Romano observes, the “national political dynamic . . . favors managers” and 
shareholders are likely to face greater collective action problems than managers in lobbying Congress. 
ROMANO, supra note 160, at 76. 
 163. See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1495 (2005) (describing the role of political activity in business operations). 
 164. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 885, 888 n.8 (1990) (stating that, in 1990, franchise taxes accounted for approximately 20% of 
Delaware’s general revenues). 
 165. ROMANO, supra note 160, at 76. 
 166. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public 
Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 321 (2004) (describing as “unsuccessful” the SEC’s efforts to compensate 
for deficiencies in state laws concerning corporate governance). 
 167. Indeed, this dynamic may be responsible for the SEC’s repeated decisions to abandon its efforts to 
provide direct shareholder nomination of directors. See Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy 
Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 62-67 (describing the SEC’s consideration and abandonment of direct 
nomination proposals); see also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 27, at 578-80 (describing a more recent SEC 
proposal to allow shareholder nomination of directors). 
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of this type of regulation.168 Another recent example is the SEC’s proposal that 
shareholders be granted access to the issuer’s proxy statement to nominate candidates for 
the board of directors.169 Despite widespread shareholder support, the measure was 
ultimately blocked through a combination of direct management opposition and political 
pressure.170 In short, public choice analysis suggests that corporate legislation, state or 
federal, is unlikely to serve the interests of investors relative to managers. 
Similarly, to the extent that corporate law is addressed to intra-stakeholder conflicts, 
shareholders are likely disadvantaged in the legislative process relative to other 
stakeholders. Labor, suppliers, customers, and community members all have the ability to 
participate in the political process. Other corporate stakeholders may have particular 
advantages in political participation relative to shareholders. Their interests may be 
aligned along a range of political issues. They may be repeat players. They may have 
greater stakes. Union lobbying and the use of political action committees have enabled 
labor to develop a powerful political presence. The Teamsters, for example, is one of the 
most powerful interest groups in Washington politics.171 Corporate creditors and 
suppliers have the concentrated stakes and traditional resources of business interests.172 
Consumers have increasingly been able to exert political pressure through organizations 
such as the AARP and through the potential voting power that they command. 
Some commentators such as Romano and Easterbrook and Fischel rely on this 
analysis to favor a market dominated approach in which investors have the option of 
using the pressure of the capital markets to pressure issuers to modify statutory default 
rules. There are reasons to believe, however, that the market based contractual approach 
is better suited to serving the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders than to protecting 
shareholder interests. Contractual modifications can be used to adjust risk, priority, or 
fixed claims. Thus, employees might respond to a rule that reduced employee perks by 
demanding higher cash compensation. Bondholders might respond to adjustments to the 
takeover market by demanding the right to approve changes in control or providing that 
such changes trigger a put option. Fixed claims also simplify a stakeholder’s monitoring 
by reducing the task to determining adherence to the contract terms. The limited duration 
of many stakeholder interests enables participants to adjust the contractual terms to 
reflect interim legal or market changes at the time of new investments. At the same time, 
most stakeholders can exit, either continuously or periodically, at relatively low cost.173 
 168. ROMANO, supra note 160, at 78. 
 169. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48-626, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2431 
(Oct. 14, 2003). 
 170. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2 
(describing the shareholder access proposal as “dead” as the result of pressure from the Bush administration and 
corporate executives). 
 171. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 163, at 1522 (describing the political influence exerted by the Teamsters in 
opposition to trucking deregulation). 
 172. Corporation statutes offer a variety of explicit protections for creditor interests such as restrictions on 
dividend payments and personal liability of directors for approving an illegal dividend. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2005) (requiring that corporations have existing surplus or net profits to pay dividends); 
id. § 174 (imposing liability on directors for unlawful payment of dividends). 
 173. A stakeholder’s ability to exit is limited by the extent to which it has made firm-specific investments 
that are incompletely protected by formal contract. The presence of such investments must be considered a 
component of firm value in that they are valuable only if the firm continues operations. 
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The value of the stakeholder’s investment is only affected to a limited extent by its 
withdrawal from the corporation. 
In contrast, the ability to use contract terms to adjust a residual stake is inherently 
limited. By definition, shareholders receive what is left over after the fixed claims of 
other stakeholders have been satisfied. If their legal rights are reduced relative to those of 
other stakeholders, they will get less, but they cannot compensate for this by putting 
themselves ahead or getting a bigger piece up front. Similarly, the value of exit to 
shareholders is overstated. Although shareholders can exit an underperforming 
corporation, in the absence of a fraudulent cover-up, the price at which they can exit will 
reflect the corporation’s poor performance. Relative to an employee, who loses only the 
value of firm-specific sunk costs, the shareholder loses more. 
As I have argued elsewhere, there are reasons to believe that courts offer a superior 
alternative to both the legislature and the market for the production of legal rules that 
protect shareholder interests.174 Courts are insulated from the financial and political 
pressures associated with the legislative process.175 Open-ended legal standards provide 
judges with the flexibility to adjust their analysis to case-specific issues and enable them 
to respond to innovations in business practice. The incremental approach of common law 
adjudication permits courts to assess the practical consequences of corporate 
developments such as poison pills, golden parachutes, and termination fees and to 
respond accordingly. Moreover, the transparency of written opinions provides a level of 
accountability.176
In addition, shareholders have far better access to the courts than to the legislatures. 
Representative lawsuits, such as shareholder derivative suits and securities class actions, 
enable the small investor to obtain access to judicial lawmaking and allow the 
aggregation of small investor interests into substantial stakes while, at the same time, 
overcoming coordination and collective action problems.177 Litigation maximizes 
participation by shareholders in corporate lawmaking.178 Specialized plaintiffs’ firms 
address concerns about complexity in corporate law and, through their expertise, enable 
shareholders to enjoy the advantages of repeat players in the litigation process. In 
addition to their issuer-specific interests, shareholders benefit from the deterrent effect of 
litigation on self-dealing and other misconduct by corporate officers and directors. 
Experience supports the conclusion that judicial lawmaking is more responsive to 
shareholder interests than the lawmaking of other institutions. Many of the most pro-
shareholder corporate law rules have been adopted through judge-made lawmaking—the 
auction requirement of Revlon, Unocal’s requirement of heightened judicial review of 
management decision-making in the takeover context, and the various expansive 
interpretations of the private right of action for federal securities fraud. Notably, where 
legislatures have responded to these rules, they have cut back on shareholder protection. 
 174. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 1088-96. 
 175. Id. at 1092-93. 
 176. Id. at 1095. 
 177. Id. at 1090-91. Concededly, the collection of legal fees imposes substantial administrative costs on 
representative shareholder litigation. 
 178. See Neil Komesar, Basic Instincts: Participation, Economics and Institutional Choice (July 8, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.wjsc.edu/ils/CIA-conference-papers.htm (highlighting 
the importance of participation in evaluating institutional competence). 
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Examples of these cutbacks include congressional adoption of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,179 which cut back on the imposition of fiduciary 
principles through federal securities fraud litigation, the Ohio legislature’s rejection of the 
Unocal standard of fiduciary principles in the takeover context,180 and the adoption of 
other constituency statutes by a variety of states to dilute the shareholder primacy norm. 
These institutional advantages explain the role of the shareholder primacy norm in 
defining the scope of fiduciary duties. Shareholder primacy has the effect of granting 
shareholders, but not other stakeholder groups, access to judicial lawmaking. The 
justification for granting courts a specialized role in protecting shareholder interests vis-
a-vis those of other corporate stakeholders, is one of institutional competence. The 
markets and the political process generally function well with respect to other corporate 
stakeholders. Because the interests of managers, employees, creditors, customers, and 
suppliers, are adequately protected through other institutions, there is little need for 
judicial intervention. Shareholders, however, are relatively disabled from using these 
institutions effectively. As a result, shareholder primacy affords shareholders access to an 
alternative institutional actor: the courts. Fiduciary duty cases provide a mechanism 
through which shareholders can trigger a lawmaking process that protects their distinctive 
interests. Moreover, unlike the markets and the legislatures, the institutional structure of 
the courts is particularly well suited to provide shareholders with meaningful access and 
voice.181
This analysis explains why fiduciary principles—and thus, judicial access—are 
limited to shareholders. The reason shareholders are protected with fiduciary duties is not 
because theirs are the only interests that count within the corporation. The interests of 
managers, customers, and employees count, but those interests are protected effectively 
through mechanisms other than fiduciary duty litigation. Indeed, at the point when 
creditor interests are in the most jeopardy—when the corporation is in the zone of 
insolvency—the courts have extended fiduciary protection to them.182 As a result, 
contrary to the claims of progressive scholars, the legitimacy of other stakeholder claims 
does not justify the extension of fiduciary principles to protect nonshareholder interests. 
Rather, the scope of existing fiduciary principles can be understood, and defended, as a 
mechanism for institutional specialization—allowing the different institutions to serve the 
interests of different corporate participants. 
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
Robert Clark suggested in 1986 that it would be misguided to attempt to choose 
 179. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
 180. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (LexisNexis 2006) (rejecting Unocal and codifying the 
existing common law). 
 181. Significantly, the market can protect the interests of future shareholders far more effectively than the 
interests of existing shareholders. On the conflict between the interests of current and future investors, see 
Schwarcz, supra note 145. As a result, legal doctrines such as the contemporaneous ownership requirement and 
the standing requirement in securities fraud litigation constrain judicial access by such future shareholders in 
favor of market remedies. 
 182. See, e.g., In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., 208 B.R. 
288 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). The creditor fiduciary duty cases, by precluding shareholders of a distressed 
corporation from gambling with creditor funds, are inconsistent with a strong version of shareholder primacy. 
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among the differing conceptions of corporate purpose, recognizing that each conception 
has both strengths and weaknesses.183 The emergence of empirical scholarship as a 
dominating force in corporate law imparts new pressure upon any effort to remain 
agnostic about the choice of corporate objectives. Efficiency analysis depends critically 
upon goal specification.184 As Susan Freiwald observes, “[s]eemingly minor variations in 
goals lead to major differences in the analysis.”185 Although Clark may have been able to 
defer the question of whether corporations should attempt to maximize shareholder value, 
firm value, societal value, or something else, for scholars seeking to evaluate and defend 
regulatory policies, articulating and defending the choice of maximand is obligatory. 
Researchers may argue that, given the difficulty of measuring nonshareholder 
interests, shareholder wealth is an acceptable, albeit second best, proxy for firm value.186 
As indicated above, this approach is particularly problematic in that corporate law, at 
least in part, is addressed to agency issues among stakeholders—allocating wealth, 
power, decision-making, or other rights among various corporate constituencies. These 
rules may have an overall effect on firm value—or they may not—but they also have 
distributional consequences. When a rule affects the division of the corporate pie, its 
effects cannot be assessed by measuring the size of a single slice. Although Coasian 
analysis suggests that the participants in the corporate contract should, in theory, allocate 
legal rights to maximize the overall size of the pie because the resulting efficiency gains 
can benefit all constituencies, there are reasons to suspect that transaction costs may 
impede such an allocation. 
Several scholars have identified broader conceptions of firm value that could be 
incorporated into empirical research. Thomas Smith has suggested broadening the 
concept of shareholder value to investor value by including the market value of a firm’s 
debt in empirical measures of firm value.187 This broadening would enable an empirical 
study to assess the effects of regulatory change on both shareholders and creditors. 
Similarly Michael Jensen has suggested a definition of firm value that includes “the sum 
of the values of all financial claims on the firm—debt, warrants, and preferred stock, as 
well as equity.”188 Although calculating this value is more complex than calculating a 
firm’s market capitalization—the full extent of financial claims may include instruments 
that are not publicly traded—this type of calculation is not unlike evaluations done for 
purposes of credit analysis.189 Extending the conception of firm value to include human 
capital, Jeffrey Gordon is doing cutting edge work attempting to develop and apply a 
methodology for measuring employee value that can be incorporated into firm value.190 
 183. CLARK, supra note 1, at 702. 
 184. See, e.g., Komesar, supra note 178, at 15-16 (criticizing both economic and philosophic analysis for 
failing adequately to define goals upon which their analysis is based). 
 185. Susan Freiwald, What A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Online Surveillance Reveals (Sept. 10, 
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/CIA-Conference-Papers.htm 
(describing importance of goal specification in comparative institutional analysis). 
 186. See Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 3, 5 (1998) (explaining that it may be desirable to allow imperfect decision-makers to take approaches 
that would not be ideal if those decision-makers were first best perfect). 
 187. Smith, supra note 81. 
 188. Jensen, supra note 133, at 8. 
 189. See also Klock et al., supra note 37 (suggesting a method for valuing privately placed debt). 
 190. Gordon, supra note 38. 
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Finally, some scholars have identified the private benefits obtained by managers or 
controlling stockholders as an independent component of firm value.191 Attempts to 
quantify these benefits are crucial for efficiency analyses in areas such as takeover 
regulation or the recent Italian corporate governance reforms. 
Modifications to statutory disclosure requirements could assist this effort. Existing 
disclosure requirements are oriented in terms of shareholder value. Standard financial 
statement disclosure focuses on indications of shareholder wealth such as net profits and 
omits many components of value provided to other sources of capital such as creditors 
and labor. Financial reporting requirements could also be modified explicitly to require 
the disclosure of other elements of firm value such as charitable donations.192
In addition, the shareholder-based measures of firm value used by empirical scholars 
distort efficiency assessments because they do not generally reflect risk.193 A 
consequence is that evaluating shareholder primacy based on a measure such as stock 
price or Tobin’s Q, may unduly emphasize risk-taking and disregard the effect of risk 
management on shareholder value.194 As one commentator observes, a low-risk 
investment that produces a low return that is in excess of the investment’s cost of capital 
does more for shareholders than a high-risk investment that produces a high return that is 
below the cost of capital.195
This observation is particularly important with respect to the extent that stock price 
reflects returns to shareholders. In theory, stock price should reflect risk-adjusted 
shareholder returns. Because two comparable firms can have different costs of capital, 
one firm’s economic profit—the ratio of its return less its cost of capital to its total 
capital—may differ substantially from another’s even if they produce comparable returns 
to shareholders. True shareholder value should be measured in terms of the excess return 
over the firm’s cost of capital.196
The business world has developed a variety of tools to measure whether a firm’s 
return on capital exceeds its cost of capital.197 One of the best known tools for evaluating 
firm productivity is economic value added (EVA).198 Developed by New York-based 
 191. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 147-49 (1999) (noting the private benefits of control that may be enjoyed 
by controlling stockholders or managers). 
 192. See Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 
745, 769 n.120 (2000) (describing proposed legislation that would have required disclosure of corporate 
charitable contributions). 
 193. See, e.g., Wachter, supra note 147, at 802 (explaining that “abnormal returns are defined on a risk-
adjusted basis”). 
 194. See, e.g., Sohnke M. Bartram, Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value 
Creation, 9 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 279 (2000) (defending corporate risk management 
as a means of increasing shareholder value). 
 195. Leonard S. Hyman, Investing in the “Plain Vanilla” Utility, 24 ENERGY L.J. 1, n.1 (2003). 
 196. See, e.g., Pablo Fernandez, A Definition of Shareholder Value Creation (Apr. 27, 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=268129 (defining shareholder value as a return that exceeds 
the required return to equity or cost of capital). 
 197. A firm’s cost of capital is computed as a weighted average of its costs of equity and debt. 
 198. See Cyrus A. Ramezani et al., Growth, Corporate Profitability, and Shareholder Value Creation 6 
(Mar. 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304880 (computing EVA as 
NOPAT (net operating profit after taxes) minus WACC (weighted average cost of capital) multiplied by 
capital). 
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Stern Stewart, EVA is the net operating profit after taxes less a charge for the firm’s cost 
of capital, a charge that reflects the opportunity cost of all capital, equity and debt 
invested in the firm.199 Stern Stewart describes EVA as “an estimate of true ‘economic’ 
profit, or the amount by which earnings exceed or fall short of the required minimum rate 
of return that shareholders and lenders could get by investing in other securities of 
comparable risk.”200 Peter Drucker explains the significance of EVA as follows: 
EVA is based on something we have known for a long time: what we call 
profits, the money left to service equity, is usually not profit at all. Until a 
business returns a profit that is greater than its cost of capital, it operates at a 
loss. Never mind that it pays taxes as if it had a genuine profit. The enterprise 
still returns less to the economy than it devours in resources. Until then it does 
not create wealth; it destroys it.201
EVA is not the only alternative measure of firm productivity.202 The business 
school and finance literature consider numerous alternatives203 and there is an ongoing 
debate over which measure is most appropriate.204 Common to all these methods is the 
recognition that, whether the goal is measuring firm value or identifying criteria to assist 
managerial decision-making, there are shortcomings to using net income or stock price. 
Commentators explicitly defend the alternative methods because they “measure 
performance from a corporate finance perspective rather than shareholder wealth 
creation.”205 Significantly, studies have found substantial differences in assessments of 
firm performance, based on the choice of methodology.206
 199. About EVA, Stern Stewart & Co. Homepage, http://www.sternstewart.com/evaabout/whatis.php (last 
visited May 4, 2006). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Peter Drucker, The Information Executives Truly Need, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 59. 
 202. The chief competitor to EVA is CFROI, an inflation-adjusted measure of cash flow return on 
investment, developed by HOLT Value Associates. Randy Myers, Metric Wars, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1996, 
at 41. A variant on CFROI is total business return (TBR), promoted by the Boston Consulting Group. Id. 
 203. Other business school measures include return on assets (ROA), market value added (MVA), and 
shareholder value added (SVA). See, e.g., John Yozzo et al., Return on Assets: So Useful . . . and So Misused, 
2001 ABA JNL. LEXIS 204, *2-4 (defining ROA as the product of total asset turnover and operating margin, 
and distinguishing ROA, which is the return to all of a firm’s suppliers of capital, from net income, which 
“belongs entirely to the firm’s shareholders”); Value Analytix, Strengths and Weaknesses, 
http://www.valueanalytix.com/articles/strengths_and_weaknesses.html (last visited May 4, 2006) (describing 
the basis of calculating SVA, EVA, and CFROI and describing the strengths and weaknesses of each 
methodology). The finance literature uses additional measures. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. 
Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 11 (Dec. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423 (employing six different performance criteria “spread out across three 
categories: operating performance, valuation and shareholder payout”). 
 204. See, e.g., Randy Myers, Measure for Measure, CFO MAG., Nov. 1, 1997, available at 
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/2990607?f=options (describing the controversy over which 
performance metric is most useful); Alix Nyberg & Bill Birchard, On Further Reflection, CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 
2001, available at www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/2991941?f=options (questioning whether EVA and other 
value metrics are useful measures of firm performance). 
 205. See Ramezani et al., supra note 198, at 7 (applying this characterization to EVA and MVA). 
 206. See, e.g., Brown & Caylor, supra note 203, at 45 tbl.5 (finding differing results depending on the 
choice of performance measure such that a firm may have good performance using one measure and poor 
performance using another measure); Pablo Fernandez, EVA and Cash Value Added Do Not Measure 
Shareholder Value Creation (May 23, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding a lack of 
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The innovation in and controversy over performance metrics in the business world 
suggest that measuring firm value and firm performance is complex.207 One of the 
reasons that the business world has been driven to search for better measures of 
productivity is the recognition that stock price is a poor measure of firm value. Even in a 
market that is relatively informationally efficient, it is unlikely that market prices reflect 
fundamental value.208 Noise may also reduce the informativeness of stock price reactions 
to regulation. As Fischer Black has explained, an efficient market is “one in which price 
is within a factor of [two] of value, i.e., the price is more than half of value and less than 
twice value.”209 The noise results, in part, from limits on the market’s ability to quantify 
the effect of regulations on future firm performance. 
In addition, as Michael Jensen has observed, the market can overvalue stocks.210 
The problem of overvalued equity highlights the potential operational damage that can 
result from focusing on shareholder primacy. Jensen argues that when stock price 
exceeds the firm’s fundamental value, managers will be pressured to make value-
destroying decisions—manipulating reported accounting figures or engaging in high risk 
negative net present value projects—in an effort to maintain the inflated price.211 Such 
actions appear justified in terms of the shareholder primacy norm. As Jensen puts it, how 
can managers argue to their board (or their shareholders) that “they must manage the 
price of their stock down?”212
Bill Bratton refers to these types of decisions as the “dark side of shareholder 
correlation when measuring firm value, over a 10-year period, among MVA, EVA, NOPAT, and WACC); 
Ramezani et al., supra note 198 (identifying differences in performance measures and finding that earnings and 
sales growth are not correlated with shareholder value creation). 
 207. A complete analysis of this complexity is beyond the scope of this Article. An example is illustrative, 
however. A Darden School case study of the relative performance of FedEx and UPS during the period 1985 to 
1995 finds that FedEx’s financial performance during that time period was much worse than that of UPS. 
Robert F. Bruner & Derick Bulkley, The Battle for Value: Federal Express Corporation vs. United Parcel 
Service of America, Inc., UVA_F_1115, Darden School Case Study (July 1997), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=299291. In particular, the study observes that “[b]etween 1985 and 1994 FedEx 
destroyed $1.36 billion in economic value while UPS created $2.08 billion.” Id. Based on these findings, the 
study questions the rationality of the stock market valuation of FedEx. On the other hand, the cumulative return 
of FedEx since its inception in 1978 has been over 9000%. FedEx Investment Calculator, 
http://fdx.client.shareholder.com/calculator.cfm (last visited May 4, 2006) (showing that an investment of 
$1000 in FedEx stock on April 12, 1978 was worth $91,638.67 as of Oct. 27, 2004). From 1999 to 2004, a 
comparable investment in the common stock of each company would have produced a cumulative return of 
107.65% for FedEx and 15.37% for UPS. Id. (calculating the return for an investment of $1000 from Nov. 10, 
1999 to Oct. 27, 2004); UPS Investment Calculator, http://www.shareholder.com/ups/calculator.cfm (last 
visited May 4, 2006) (calculating the return for an investment of $1000 from Nov. 10, 1999 to Oct. 27, 2004). 
 208. See Jill E. Fisch, Picking A Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 464 (1995) (explaining the difference between 
informational efficiency and fundamental value efficiency); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market 
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986) (describing evidence indicating the absence of 
fundamental value efficiency). 
 209. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986). Black concedes that the factor of two is “arbitrary,” 
but explains that it is “reasonable . . . in the light of sources of uncertainty about value and the strength of the 
forces tending to cause price to return to value.” Id. 
 210. Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate 
Finance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549 (2004). 
 211. Id. at 555. 
 212. Id. at 562. 
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value.”213 Bratton identifies as one reason for Enron’s spectacular collapse its obsession 
with meeting the short-term performance demands of its institutional investors. As Enron 
stated in its annual report, “it was a company ‘laser-focused on earnings per share.’”214 
The implication of Bratton’s analysis is that shareholder primacy, aggressively pursued, 
can be inconsistent with maximizing firm value and can, instead, lead to a “cultural 
pathology.”215 Importantly, to the extent that managers take on excessive risk or 
manipulate their reported numbers in an effort to increase or maintain inflated stock 
prices, these decisions impose an overall cost to the market that investors cannot 
eliminate through diversification. 
Empirical studies based on the shareholder primacy norm reinforce managerial 
decisions to focus exclusively on measures of shareholder value such as stock price and 
net profits. By endorsing regulatory and operational decisions that maximize stock price 
without regard to the effect of those decisions on risk, sustainability, or other corporate 
stakeholders, the studies risk legitimizing undesirable management behavior. Stock 
options, phantom stock, and other equity-based forms of management compensation 
increase the risk, as illustrated by the dramatic pay-offs that Enron executives were able 
to generate by maintaining Enron’s stock price for just a few years. 
In sum, focusing exclusively on shareholder wealth, and, in particular, on relatively 
simplistic measures of that wealth, in assessing firm value is wrong. It is wrong because 
shareholder wealth does not include the interests of other stakeholders. It is wrong 
because shareholder wealth is ephemeral and not accurately measured through short-term 
stock prices. And it is wrong because the focus on shareholder wealth encourages 
operational decisions that may ultimately destroy firm value. As Richard Roll has 
observed, “stock price increases do not necessarily imply increases in the economic value 
of the total firm.”216
VI. CONCLUSION 
Law and economics scholars have embraced the shareholder primacy norm and 
incorporated it into their empirical analyses of corporate law. As a result, studies 
designed to evaluate the effect of legal rules that allocate power among corporate 
stakeholders analyze those rules in terms of their effect on shareholder wealth. The result 
is an increasingly influential body of scholarship that offers normative assessments of 
regulatory policy based on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, 
and Tobin’s Q. 
This Article challenges the incorporation of the shareholder primacy norm into 
empirical analysis. Shareholder value is neither the equivalent of firm value nor a 
reasonable proxy for firm value, particularly when applied to the agency context upon 
which corporate law is focused. Existing legal doctrine and economic theory do not 
justify evaluating regulatory policy exclusively in terms of shareholder interests. Nor can 
existing limits on the enforcement of management fiduciary duties be used as a basis for 
 213. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002). 
 214. Id. at 1284 (citing ENRON, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2001)). 
 215. Id. at 1357. 
 216. Richard Roll, Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth, in KNIGHTS, 
RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 241, 248 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988). 
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limiting the corporation’s objectives to maximizing shareholder interests. Instead, as this 
Article has demonstrated, fiduciary principles are properly understood as a mechanism 
for institutional specialization in the context of inter-stakeholder conflicts. Rules that 
grant shareholders a unique degree of judicial access do not privilege the interests of 
shareholders in the evaluation of firm value. 
The measures of shareholder value typically employed by empirical scholars pose 
additional problems. In addition to omitting the interests of other stakeholders, measures 
of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, and Tobin’s Q may be distorted by 
market deficiencies and inefficiencies, risk, and noise. Furthermore, academic 
endorsement of such measures—and short-term stock price in particular—as benchmarks 
of efficiency may reinforce inappropriate managerial decisions. The extensive business 
and financial research aimed at developing better measures of firm value and 
performance should give pause to legal academics. 
This Article does not make the normative claim that corporations should be operated 
in the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders or society at large; nor does it support 
expanding the scope of fiduciary duties to protect nonshareholders. Robert Clark’s 
warning about the difficulty of defining the corporate objective continues to ring true. 
This Article simply advocates caution in the use of shareholder primacy in empirical 
research. Although future scholarship may demonstrate that shareholder value can 
appropriately be used as a proxy for firm value, as yet, scholars have not made that case. 
 
